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Abstract 
The conflict in Israel-Palestine is over the sovereign control of territory and takes place 
within a global framework made up of clearly defined nation-states. It is within this 
framework that Israeli colonial expansion and construction of the separation barrier in the 
West Bank attempt to maximize Israeli annexation of the oPt while creating a Palestinian 
Bantustan ―state‖ to contain and isolate the Palestinian people in non-sovereign territorial 
enclaves through the use of territoriality as a strategy for exercising sovereignty. In 
response to this obvious process of cantonization, Palestinians are resisting by supporting 
Israeli annexation – of the West Bank and its Arab population. That way, the Palestinian 
people can protect their rights as citizens of the State of Israel.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The conflict in Israel-Palestine is, at its core, a conflict over land and its control, 
regardless of the symbolic or practical connections each group has to this specific piece 
of territory. Noam Chomsky frames it as a ―conflict between two nations that claim the 
right of national self-determination in the same territory, which each regards as its 
historic homeland,‖ and numerous authors and scholars agree with this assessment 
(Chomsky 2003, 83; Yiftachel 2002; Gelvin 2005, 2007; Zertal & Eldar 2005, 2007; Roy 
2006). The present conflict is 
not over the formation of a 
Jewish State; such a state 
exists within the 1949 borders 
and is going nowhere (despite 
the fact that some supporters 
of Israeli policy may say 
otherwise). Rather, today the 
conflict centers on the Israeli 
colonization of the occupied 
Palestinian territories (oPt) 
(the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip). This thesis will focus 
primarily on the West Bank 
where Israeli expansion is 
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ongoing through construction of the separation barrier
1
. Clearly, the main issue of this 
conflict is the delimitation of Palestine; according to Gideon Biger, ―[t]he whole issue 
can be summarized by one question—where should the separation line run?‖ (Biger 
2008, 91). The goal of Israeli expansion is the maximization of its territory and the 
creation of Palestinian Bantustans to house the native Arab population (Biger 2008, 68).  
I theorize that construction of the ―security‖ barrier in the West Bank is part of an 
ongoing process to maximize Israel‘s territorial annexation of the oPt. The cantonization 
of the West Bank Palestinians serves the interests of the State of Israel in that it enables 
Israel to annex as much of the Palestinian territory as possible without annexing 
the Palestinian people, thereby disrupting the demographic balance of the Jewish State. 
The creation of a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ (made up of 3 or more cantons in the West 
Bank, plus Gaza) would allow Israel to maximize its annexation of the oPt without being 
responsible for the Palestinian people, who would have their own (de jure, not de facto) 
state within which to govern themselves ―independently.‖ Obviously, this Palestinian 
Bantustan entity would not be sovereign, according to the Westphalian model, but the 
occupation would continue under another name without Israel being officially responsible 
for the rights and well-being of the Palestinian people.  
When I assert that a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ would not be sovereign, I mean 
this in the sense that it will have no territorial contiguity, no control over the flows of 
trade, populations or information across its borders (which would all be shared with 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the course of this paper, the scholars cited and I may refer to the barrier/wall 
interchangeably as: the separation barrier/wall, the apartheid barrier/wall, or the ―security‖ 
barrier/wall. In the last instance, when I called it a ―security‖ barrier, I‘m implying that it really 
has nothing to do with security. Authors who call it the security barrier, without quotes, 
believe/assert that is does serve a security purpose. Additionally, some authors may refer to the 
barrier as the Wall – capitalized to suggest a specific wall: the one being constructed by Israel in 
the West Bank. 
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Israel, as the Israeli state would surround the Bantustans), no control over its airspace, 
etc. The ―state‖ would remain economically trapped and dependent on Israel. As far as 
security for Palestinians is concerned, it is unlikely that the ―state‖ would be allowed (by 
Israel) to have a strong standing army. Additionally, the way the Bantustans are 
emerging, a majority if not all of the water resources and the most viable land will be 
claimed by the Jewish State, and Palestinians would not have access to these resources 
(i.e., the ―state‖ could not be self-sufficient). In summation, the Palestinian Bantustan 
entity would not be able to keep Israel out, and therefore ―statehood‖ would not fulfill the 
requirement of Westphalian sovereignty and its principle of nonintervention: ―political 
organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a 
given territory‖ (Krasner 1999, 4). The occupation would continue under another name 
since, as Jeff Halper explains it, Palestinians would remain under Israel‘s ―matrix of 
control‖ (Halper 2006, 63). 
The Palestinian people are responding to this trend by calling for complete Israeli 
annexation of the oPt, so that they might defend their rights as citizens of Israel rather 
than continue under occupation in a series of non-sovereign Bantustans. Though 
historically anti-colonial struggle has aimed at pushing back from the colonizer and 
creating a separate, sovereign entity where the native inhabitants could enjoy their right 
to self-determination, Palestinians are resisting in a way that breaks with most struggles 
for decolonization. Palestinians are pushing for annexation into Israel because they 
recognize that a Palestinian ―state,‖ as being modeled by Israel, would never be truly 
sovereign. Therefore, instead of pursuing national self-determination as an independent 
state, they are attempting to protect their natural rights as citizens of the state of Israel.  
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Not all Palestinians are choosing annexation – this is a new trend. In fact, this 
year the Palestinian Authority, purportedly representing the Palestinian people, went to 
the United Nations to unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood – a move that could have 
very negative ramifications for the Palestinian people if that state should be formed on 
the territory currently unoccupied by Israel. This push for statehood could, in fact, 
irreparably damage the Palestinian national cause, ensuring their cantonization in 
numerous non-sovereign, discontinuous, and isolated territorial enclaves. 
Things look bleak for Palestinians because a Palestinian state will never be truly 
independent of Israel and is more likely to take the form of a collection of non-sovereign 
Bantustans. However Israel should be wary, because it is an ―essential condition‖ that 
―[n]o battle… takes place as those who planned it anticipated‖ (Tolstoy quoted in Scott 
1998, 309). Israel has planned for the cantonization of the West Bank Palestinians, but 
Palestinian resistance may have found a new tactic that Israelis did not anticipate: 
annexation as a means for procuring Palestinian rights as citizens. This tactic recognizes 
that a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ would never be truly autonomous, so while 
historically ―[o]vercoming [the historical trajectory set up by the forces of imperialism] 
required the exertion of force by the inhabitants of the territory,‖ this new trend in 
resistance aimed at reversing the trajectory of Israeli colonization, but is instead calling 
Israel‘s bluff by continuing on this trajectory towards total annexation (Kohn & McBride 
2011, 110). The danger is that ―even achieving the status as citizen [is] not tantamount to 
self-determination‖ and there is no telling what the outcome for Palestinians will be 
(Kohn & McBride 2011, 57).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 The conflict in Israel-Palestine is over the sovereign control of territory and takes 
place within a global framework made up of clearly defined nation-states. It is within this 
framework that Israeli colonial expansion and construction of the separation barrier in the 
West Bank attempt to maximize Israeli annexation of the oPt while creating Palestinian 
Bantustans to contain and isolate the Palestinian people in non-sovereign territorial 
enclaves. In response to this obvious process of cantonization, Palestinians are resisting 
by supporting Israeli annexation – of the West Bank and its Arab population. That way, 
the Palestinian people can protect their rights as citizens of the State of Israel.  
Below I will lay out the significance of sovereignty and territoriality in the nation-
state system in order to discuss how Israeli expansion into the occupied Palestinian 
territories represents an attempt to redraw the map of sovereignty in such a way that the 
―state‖ of Palestine consists of Bantustans surrounded by Israeli territory. Since territory 
is commonly regarded as an aspect of sovereignty in international relations theory, and 
sovereignty is commonly understood as being endemic to the state, it should be clear how 
these three theories overlap. Sovereignty is based on and bounded by territory, 
territoriality is a process aimed at creating and controlling a territory, and once this 
territory is expressed it is embodied by the modern nation-state. All of these commonly 
accepted assumptions place ―Palestine‖ on shaky ground – without sovereignty, territory, 
or statehood. However, Palestine does not lack popular resistance, and in the final pages 
of this literature review I will explain a common pattern of anti-colonial resistance and 
how Palestinians are breaking from it. 
_______________ 
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Sovereignty 
First I will discuss sovereignty, which is a concept often taken for granted in the 
contemporary world comprised of bounded nation-states. It is a difficult concept to pin 
down: every state wants it, is assumed to have it, yet what is it? For Max Weber 
sovereignty means the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territory 
(Weber 1980, 29). Michel Foucault, in Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
College de France 1977-1978, describes sovereignty as being first of all exercised within 
the borders of a territory – this is, in fact, its primary characteristic (Foucault 2009, 11). 
The common thread throughout the literature on sovereignty is that it requires and is 
bounded by territory. As David Delaney states, ―modern sovereignty is inextricable from 
modern territory‖ (Delaney 2005, 36).  
I will return to this idea of the mutuality of sovereignty and territory towards the 
end of this section and into the next, but first I would like to outline two forms of 
sovereignty of particular interest to this study: international legal sovereignty and 
Westphalian sovereignty. According to Stephen D. Krasner in his book Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy, sovereignty is ―an institutional arrangement associated with a 
particular bundle of characteristics—recognition, territory, exclusive authority, and 
effective internal and transborder regulation or control‖ (Krasner 1999, 227). Not all of 
these characteristics are always present and sovereignty is regularly compromised and/or 
violated. The fact that sovereignty has explicit rules that are so often violated is why 
Krasner refers to it as ―organized hypocrisy‖ (Krasner 1999).  
Sovereignty is understood to have four basic components: territory, recognition, 
autonomy and control. These aspects of sovereignty can be arranged (with varied 
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emphasis) to produce four different forms of sovereignty: (1) international legal 
sovereignty, (2) Westphalian sovereignty, (3) domestic sovereignty, and (4) 
interdependence sovereignty (Krasner 1999). The first form of sovereignty, international 
legal sovereignty, refers to ―the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually 
between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence‖ (Krasner 1999, 3). 
Note the qualification that entities with international legal sovereignty only usually are 
territorial and independent. The second, Westphalian sovereignty, is described as 
―political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures 
within a given territory‖ (Krasner 1999, 4). Territory, in this instance, is a requirement. 
The third, domestic sovereignty, concerns ―the formal organization of political authority 
within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within 
the borders of their own polity‖ (Krasner 1999, 4). This closely aligns with Weber‘s 
definition of sovereignty, which tends to focus inward with little reference to other 
polities, as a state is understood to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within 
a given territory. And finally, interdependence sovereignty refers to ―the ability of public 
authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital 
across the borders of their state‖ (Krasner 1999, 4). This is the form of sovereignty that is 
considered threatened by processes of globalization and its associated flows. Krasner 
makes it very clear that these four forms of sovereignty are not necessarily coterminous, 
and that a state can have one form of sovereignty and not another. The two forms of 
sovereignty that are most relevant to this paper are international legal sovereignty and 
Westphalian sovereignty. 
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The basic principle of international legal sovereignty is recognition, which is 
extended to entities (usually states) ―with territory and formal juridical authority‖ 
(Krasner 1999, 14). However, recognition could be granted without territory or autonomy 
– that is, without the existence of a physical state. As such, international legal sovereignty 
is the only of Krasner‘s four forms of sovereignty that can be present at all without the 
existence of a clearly defined territory. For example, though the main rule of international 
legal sovereignty is recognition of a state with a territory, ―[s]tates have recognized other 
governments even when they did not have effective control over their claimed territory‖ 
(Krasner 1999, 15). This is part of the ‗hypocrisy‘ of sovereignty that Krasner points out: 
rules are often broken. Krasner explains that in practice, ―international legal sovereignty 
does not guarantee the territorial integrity of any state or even the existence of a state,‖ 
(Krasner 1999, 19). This will become important when discussing the declaration of 
Palestinian statehood in front of the UN in September 2011. 
There is an understanding that, even in its non-territorial shape, international legal 
sovereignty can function and provide a source of power to its holder. Krasner explains 
that for ―rulers with limited material strength, international legal sovereignty, recognition, 
was valued because it could provide external resources and enhance internal legitimacy‖ 
(Krasner 1999, 38-39). In fact, he specifically uses the Palestinian case as an example, 
pointing out that the ―Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was given observer 
status in the United Nations in 1974 and this status was changed to that of a mission in 
1988 coincident with the declaration of Palestinian independence even though the PLO 
did not have any independent control over territory‖ (Krasner 1999, 15-16). The PLO 
was recognized despite the absence of defined borders and territorial autonomy.  
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The other form of sovereignty that is most relevant to this study is Westphalian 
sovereignty, which is based on two principles: ―territoriality and the exclusion of external 
actors from domestic authority structures‖ (Krasner 1999, 20). Territory in Westphalian 
sovereignty is a requirement, because even if the purported holder of sovereignty is given 
recognition (as in international legal sovereignty) how can it be said to exclude external 
actors if it is not enclosed in a clearly-defined territory? For this form of sovereignty, ―the 
fundamental norm… is that states exist in specific territories‖ – an idea which I will take 
up again when discussing the nation-state (Krasner 1999, 20).  
The primary rule of Westphalian sovereignty is ―preserving the de facto 
autonomy of a territorial political entity‖ (Krasner 1999, 25). Notice that what must be 
preserved is de facto (actual) autonomy, not de jure (legal) autonomy. This does not refer 
to an entity‘s legal right to exercise sovereignty within a territory, but its actual ability to 
do so. In this way Westphalian sovereignty differs dramatically from international legal 
sovereignty, which can mean recognition of the right to sovereignty without actual 
autonomy within a territory. Palestinians are pushing for international legal sovereignty 
in the United Nations in September 2011 because it is what they realistically can achieve 
(they can be recognized, despite the fact that they have no borders and autonomy from 
Israel), but how much good will it do without Westphalian sovereignty? Westphalian 
sovereignty seems to be the more powerful and meaningful of the two forms; it is more 
concrete (in part because it is anchored in territory) and therefore less an abstract concept. 
Territory is a necessary condition of autonomy, and both are requirements of 
Westphalian sovereignty, if not always international legal sovereignty. Though there are 
benefits to recognition, de jure autonomy without de facto autonomy will only go so far 
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in an international legal system in which sovereignty bounded by a nation-state (which is 
territorial by definition) is the respected and accepted norm. Territory is a powerful 
component of sovereignty, exemplified by the fact that the principle common thread 
identified by a review of the major conceptual literature on sovereignty is the centrality of 
territory (Weber 1980, 29; Krasner 1999; Philpott 2010; Delaney 2005; Walker 1993, 
165-166). The underlying theme throughout characterizations of the concept of 
sovereignty is territoriality: the idea that sovereignty is exercised within and bounded by 
a specific territory.  
_______________ 
Territoriality 
 Since the common linkage between the various definitions of sovereignty is 
territory, it is important to explore territoriality and its (political) function. Many writers 
on territoriality and sovereignty note the close, and often implied, connection between the 
two concepts (Krasner 1999; Mendlovitz & Walker 1990; Delaney 2005). For example, 
David Delaney states: ―Formally, to be ‗sovereign‘ is to have absolute authority within a 
territorial space and to suffer no interference by parties outside of that space‖ – a 
definition very much in line with Krasner‘s explanation of Westphalian sovereignty 
(Delaney 2005, 36). It is clear that Delaney is referring to Westphalian sovereignty, and 
that his understanding is that sovereignty and territory go hand in hand and that territory 
is a requirement of sovereignty at the same time as it is a means of gaining and exercising 
it. Below I lay out the definition and function of territoriality as expounded first by 
Robert David Sack and then by David Delaney. 
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In his book Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, Robert David Sack 
defines territoriality as ―the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or 
control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a 
geographic area‖ (Sack 1986, 19). This ‗assertion of control‘ could easily be conceived 
of as sovereignty, and territoriality as an attempt to exert it. Sovereignty, conceived here 
as an attempt to affect, influence or control people by controlling a geographic area, 
seems to refer to domestic sovereignty, though asserting control over a geographic area 
also means excluding external actors, as with Westphalian sovereignty.  
According to Sack, territoriality has three requirements, namely: (1) ―territoriality 
must involve a form of classification by area,‖ (2) ―territoriality must contain a form of 
communication… a marker,‖ and (3) ―each instance of territoriality must involve an 
attempt at enforcing control over access‖ (Sack 1986, 21-22). These three requirements 
translate to (1) the identification of a territory, (2) the drawing of its borders, and (3) the 
exercise of sovereign power over it. Sack asserts that ―territoriality in humans supposes a 
control over an area or space that must be conceived of and communicated…. a spatial 
strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as 
a strategy, territoriality can be turned on and off‖ (Sack 1986, 1-2). In other words, 
territoriality is a strategy ‗to affect, influence, and control‘ – a strategy for exercising 
sovereignty. 
Focusing on the conceptualization of territoriality as a strategy, Michel de Certeau 
says that strategies ―conceal beneath objective calculations their connection with the 
power that sustains them from within the stronghold of its own ‗proper‘ place or 
institution‖ (de Certeau 1984, xx). I interpret this to mean that since territoriality, as a 
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strategy, is such a taken-for-granted concept (much like sovereignty), it conceals its true 
goal beneath the obvious and superficial aim of territorial control. This reinforces a claim 
by David Delaney that ―one important aspect of how territoriality commonly works is 
through its being regarded in a rather taken-for-granted way as an almost natural 
phenomenon‖: 
To the extent that territory (e.g. nationalist territory, or private property) appears to be 
self-evident, necessary, or inquestionable, it may obscure the play of power and politics 
in its formation and maintenance. Actions based on or in furtherance of territory may be 
easily justified by ―communal‖ or universalizing claims. But, to the extent that it – or any 
given manifestation of it – is seen as contingent, socially constructed, ideologically 
informed, and, when push comes to shove, enforced by physical violence, then the forms 
of power which are inherently connected to territory may become more visible, and 
justifications, more clearly partial or partisan (Delaney 2005, 11). 
 
The aim of territorial control is accepted as an end in itself, rather than as a means to 
another end, such as the marginalization of the ―other‖ – i.e., the marginalization of other 
inhabitants of that space. The taken-for-granted nature of territorial control aids Israel‘s 
annexation of most of the occupied Palestinian territories. In laying out its future borders 
through territorialization, Israel is creating a Palestinian Bantustan state with no real 
autonomy – a process that is going largely unnoticed by the international community. As 
Certeau states, ―[s]trategies do not ‗apply‘ principles or rules; they choose among them to 
make up the repertory of their operations‖ (de Certeau 1984, 54). The strategy of 
territorialization and the possibility of redrawing borders do not follow international 
rules, but violate them in ways that are considered ―normal.‖  
David Delaney‘s interpretation of territoriality is built upon the shoulders of Sack. 
In Territory: a short introduction, Delaney describes territoriality as a verb, an activity; 
specifically, territoriality is ―a social (and political, economic, cultural) process that 
unfolds not only in place but through time‖ and territories are its resulting ―social 
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products‖ (Delaney 2005, 2). Since territoriality is a verb it has a subject, which entails 
―deliberation, intentionality, or strategy‖ in its use (Delaney 2005, 16). Territory is not 
neutral. It is a tool, a ‗device,‘ and one of its most important functions is that it is 
―commonly understood as a device for simplifying and clarifying something else, such as 
political authority, cultural identity, individual autonomy, or rights‖ (Delaney 2005, 9). In 
other words, it is a device for simplifying sovereignty. Israeli control over the West Bank 
is concerned with de facto sovereignty, or creating enough ―facts on the ground‖ that the 
occupied Palestinian territories are effectively annexed and impossible to negotiate in the 
future. ―What makes an enclosed space a territory is, first, what it signifies, and second, 
that the meanings it carries or conveys refer to or implicate social power;‖ territoriality in 
the occupied Palestinian territories signifies Israel‘s de facto sovereignty over all of 
historical Palestine (Delaney 2005, 17). 
Delaney also discusses processes of re-territorialization, or the re-drawing of 
borders. First, using the example of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he states that the 
invasion/occupation of territory, ―a method by which the government of one nation-state 
attempted to annex to itself the territory of another, and with no better justification,‖ is 
one of the ways the map of sovereignty is redrawn (Delaney 2005, 3).
 
If the occupying 
power is successful in annexing the land, then ―[i]ts manifest destiny, its unquestionable 
supremacy, were validated on the field of battle, and the map of sovereignty was 
redrawn‖ (Delaney 2005, 3). Israeli settlement expansion and the path of the security 
barrier, cutting deep into the West Bank in places, should be understood in these terms: 
as an attempt to redraw the map of sovereignty. In this instance ‗sovereignty‘ refers to 
Westphalian sovereignty, which requires autonomy within a territory. Furthermore, ―[t]he 
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boundary of a territory may be expressed by physical structures – fences, walls, gates or 
doors…. The point here is that a territory and its boundary are meaningful. They are 
significant in so far as they signify‖ (Delaney 2005, 14). Michel de Certeau refers to this 
exercise as ―bornage‖ – ―an ‗operation of marking out boundaries‘‖ (de Certeau 1984, 
122).
 2
 As Delaney states, boundaries are meaningful, they signify, and ―[t]erritories are 
not only spatial entities but also communicative devices‖ (Delaney 2005, 15). What Israel 
is communicating with its boundaries and territorialization of Palestine is ―this is ours.‖ 
Richard Falk describes Israeli expansion as ―part of a psychological war being waged 
against the Palestinian people on behalf of a vision of Greater Israel‖ because ―it casts 
doubts as to whether Israel ever intends to withdraw, and by so doing creates an 
uncertainty in Palestinian minds‖ that the occupation will ever end (Falk 2003, 100; 
Reuveny 2003, 368). 
Delaney conceives of territoriality as being more than a strategy for controlling 
space: ―It is better understood as implicating and being implicated in ways of thinking, 
acting, and being in the world – ways of world-making informed by beliefs, desires, and 
culturally and historically contingent ways of knowing. It is as much a metaphysical 
phenomenon as a material one. Territory, in turn, informs key aspects of collective and 
individual identities. It shapes and is shaped by collective social and self-consciousness‖ 
(Delaney 2005, 13).
3
 Territoriality is ―the relationship between territories and some other 
social phenomena. It draws attention to the territorial aspects, conditions, or implications 
of something else. So, the territoriality of state authority focuses on the spatial aspect of 
                                                          
2
 For information on the use of maps in creating and delineating territorial space, see Leuenberger & 
Schnell 2010; Scott 1998; de Certeau, 1984. 
3
 For the purposes of this paper, I focus on territoriality as a means of controlling space and inscribing it 
with sovereignty, but for more on the spatial component of identity formation, see Glaeser 2000, Malkki 
1992 and Redekop 2002. 
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formal political power‖ – political power meaning sovereignty (Delaney 15). Territory 
and sovereignty seem to have a cyclical relationship; each is a requirement of the other 
because for space to be territory it must be territorialized, or have power (sovereignty) 
exercised on it, and for Westphalian sovereignty to exist, it must be expressed in a 
territory.  
The cyclical relationship between sovereignty and territory finds its expression in 
the modern nation-state. As Michel Foucault expresses: ―What is a sovereign? …. What 
is territory? …. these things began to be thought of as elements of the state‖ – and still 
they are regarded as such (Foucault 2009, 286). 
_______________ 
Nation-State System 
The notion of sovereignty combined with that of territoriality finds its expression 
in the overwhelming prevalence of the modern framework of the nation-state system, 
which is assumed in much of the literature on nations and nationalism to be an almost 
natural and implicit phenomenon (Gellner 1983; Giddens 1987, 116, 119; Hobsbawm 
1990, 9-10; Delaney 2005, 35, 58; Anderson 2006, 3, 135l; Walker 1993, 165-166; 
Foucault 2009; Van Der Pijl 2011). This observation is reiterated by Krasner:  
Most observers and analysts of international relations have treated sovereign states as an 
analytic assumption or a well-institutionalized if not taken-for-granted structure. The 
bundle of properties associated with sovereignty—territory, recognition, autonomy, and 
control—have been understood, often implicitly, to characterize states in the international 
system (Krasner 1999, 220).  
 
Westphalian sovereignty, with its basic rule of territorial autonomy, takes as its 
fundamental norm that ―states exist in specific territories,‖ and modern territoriality refers 
to ―the capacity to conceive of the entire planet as a single place carved up into mutually 
exclusive, putatively sovereign states‖ (Krasner 1999, 20; Delaney 2005, 23). According 
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to Benedict Anderson, ―nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the 
political life of our time‖ (Anderson 2006, 3). Therefore, the nation-state is taken as an 
analytical given, embodied with both sovereignty and territory. 
This accepted framework of a world made up of bounded, autonomous nation-
states aids in the Israeli annexation of Palestine and the redrawing of the map of 
sovereignty, as ―the proliferation and dispersal of the territorial nation-state as the sole 
legitimate expression of political identity and authority‖ leaves no room for entities that 
are not formal states (Delaney 2005, 21). ―For the English school [of international 
relations] the defining characteristic of the present international system is that ‗the 
independent state has everywhere become the standard form of territorial political 
organization and all conflicting standards have been discredited and in most cases 
abandoned‘‖ (Krasner 1999, 46).  
Liisa Malkki, in ―National Geographic: the Rooting of Peoples and the 
Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees,‖ comments on the 
hegemony of the nation-state system, stating: ―That the world should be composed of 
sovereign, spatially discontinuous units is a sometimes implicit, sometimes stated 
premise in much of the literature on nations and nationalism‖ (Malkki 1992, 26). She 
states that the global map is made up of clear-cut boundaries and does not allow for 
―fuzzy spaces‖ or the bleeding of boundaries (Malkki 1992, 26). In some ways Palestine 
is the ultimate ―fuzzy space‖: it doesn‘t exist on the world map, its borders are constantly 
in flux, and it is populated by two nations (Israelis and Palestinians). By annexing the 
land and creating a Palestinian Bantustan ―state,‖ Israel can erase the ―fuzzy space‖ that 
currently exists and does not fit accepted models of statehood in a world in which the 
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nation-state is ―the overwhelming norm‖ (Anderson 2006, 135). In line with Delaney‘s 
assertion that the state is ―[c]onventionally regarded as a quasi-natural ‗container‘ of its 
associated ‗society‘‖ (Delaney 2005, 35), Malkki states:  
The national order of things… usually passes as the normal or natural order of things. For 
it is self-evident that ‗real‘ nations are fixed in space and ‗recognizable‘ on a map. One 
country cannot at the same time be another country. The world of nations is thus 
conceived as a discrete spatial partitioning of territory; it is territorialized in the 
segmentary fashion of the multicolored school atlas (Malkki 1992, 26).  
 
Borders cannot be vague if the world of nations is conceived as discrete spatial 
partitionings of territory. In Israel-Palestine there is not a discrete border, and this fact 
allows Israel to exercise sovereignty in the oPt. ―Sovereignty exists both at the normative 
and factual level. States assert sovereign rights and ‗they also actually exercise, in 
varying degrees, such supremacy and independence in practice. An independent political 
community which merely claims a right to sovereignty (or is judged by others to have 
such a right) but cannot assert this right in practice, is not a state properly so-called‘‖ 
(Krasner 1999, 47). Therefore, any Palestinian Bantustan state that takes shape, lacking 
as it will any real sovereignty, will never be a proper state and will never have 
independence. 
 Tying sovereignty, territoriality and the nation-state system together, sovereignty 
can be conceived of as ―‗a ticket of general admission to the international arena,‘‖ but 
this admission is dependent on whether the holder of sovereignty is a territorial state 
(Krasner 1999, 16). A territory is ―a bounded social space that inscribes a certain sort of 
meaning into defined segments of the material world‖ – these ‗segments‘ are modern 
nation-states, and if the modern policy is the state ―the fundamental characteristic of 
authority within it [is] sovereignty‖ (Delaney 2005, 14; Philpott 2010). In this way, 
sovereignty, territory, and the nation-state system intertwine to create the conditions 
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favorable to the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan state surrounded by (annexed) Israeli 
sovereign territory. 
_______________ 
Resistance 
Historically, postcolonial resistance has entailed the colonized pushing back 
against the colonizer, responding with a counterforce in order to obtain some degree of 
autonomy or self-determination. As stated by Rafael Reuveny, ―[h]istorically, 
colonialism involved states‘ expansion beyond their borders and indigenous populations‘ 
eventual rejection of this expansion‖ (Reuveny 2003, 352). This counterforce can take 
many forms, but generally entails a rejection of the colonization.  
Briefly, I feel it is necessary to draw a distinction between the international legal 
principle occupatio bellica
4
 and settler colonialism because, as Richard Falk says, the 
Palestinians ―find themselves being ‗colonized‘ by an alien power against their will and 
under the pretext of ‗belligerent occupation‘‖ (Falk 2003, 114). Many other scholars and 
observers also assert, to varying degrees, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
characterized by Israeli colonialism (Reuveny 2003; Parry 2011; Beinin 2011; Delaney 
2005; Hochberg 2006; Gelvin 2005, 2007; Aaronsohn 1996; Van Der Pijl 2011). 
Therefore, a brief discussion of Israeli colonialism will serve as a point of departure for 
an exploration of anti-colonial resistance – resistance in the form of ―national liberation 
in opposition to imperialist domination‖ (Cabral 1994, 54-55). 
The principle of international law known as occupatio bellica is founded on ―the 
sharp distinction between a change of sovereignty, i.e., a territorial change, and the 
provisional change of a military occupation‖ (Schmitt 2003, 206). Under the doctrine of 
                                                          
4
 Belligerent/military occupation. 
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occupatio bellica, ―the occupying state exercised state power in the occupied enemy 
territory; however, it did not exercise its own power, but rather that of the state of the 
occupied territory, and this exercise of foreign state power was based not on 
empowerment of the enemy state‘s authority, but rather on its own original legal title in 
international law‖ (Schmitt 2003, 206). Because Israel is not exercising sovereignty in the 
name of the Palestinian inhabitants of the oPt, but rather in the name of Israeli settlers, 
the Israeli presence in the oPt is a project of settler colonialism and not belligerent 
occupation. 
First, the Israeli occupation of the oPt is aimed at a permanent territorial change, 
or a change of sovereignty, not at ―the provisional change of a military occupation‖ 
(Schmitt 2003, 206). As Thomas Hobbes recognizes, conquest is a way to exercise 
―sovereignty by acquisition,‖ as it is ―the process whereby the colonial power uses its 
military superiority to conquer a weaker society and exploit the native people and 
resources for its own benefit‖ (Kohn & McBride 2011, 91). Occupatio bellica, as 
opposed to settler colonialism, is merely a provisional change; but clearly the building of 
permanent settlements in the Palestinian territories and construction of the separation 
barrier cannot be described in any way as ―provisional.‖ Second, the occupying state 
(Israel) is attempting to exercise its own power in the oPt, based on empowerment of its 
own authority; Israel is not exercising the power ―of the state of the occupied territory‖ 
based on ―its own original legal title in international law‖ (Schmitt 2003, 206). Therefore, 
Israel is clearly not engaged in occupatio bellica, but rather in settler colonialism in the 
oPt.  
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 The key resource of settler colonialism is land, and therefore I do not feel that 
annexation is an unintended side-effect of settlement and construction of the barrier, but 
that both are built explicitly to expand the Israeli power structure over the territories, 
creating a situation in which the Israeli state can exercise de facto sovereignty in the West 
Bank (Kohn & McBride 2011, 99). According to Kohn and McBride, ―colonial rule 
based its legitimacy on force rather than on consent, mutual benefit, or tradition‖ (Kohn 
& McBride 2011, 91). Construction of the barrier and the cantonization of the Palestinian 
people represent Israel exerting sovereignty in the oPt through territorial acquisition 
achieved by the use of force. 
Israeli colonization, like other colonial projects, gives rise to a rejection of this 
colonization by the native inhabitants. Historically this rejection has entailed a pushing 
away of the colonizer and an attempt at achieving separate independence. Resistance 
should be viewed as the natural response to conquest and annexation; since Israel is a 
colonial state, Palestinians should be seen as ―fighting a legitimate struggle‖ (Sayigh 
1979, 8). The legitimacy of this struggle, termed a ―right of resistance‖ by Richard Falk, 
derives from Israel‘s failure to abide by the rules of belligerent occupation (Falk 2006, 
316). Falk states that, ―in international law, Palestinian resistance to occupation is a 
legally protected right,‖ and as far as he is concerned it is ―Israel‘s seizure of land in 
violation of Palestinian rights that provokes Palestinian resistance‖ (Falk 2006, 315, 321). 
In other words, resistance does not take place in a vacuum, but occurs as a response to 
another force that has been exerted; Amilcar Cabral terms this ―counterforce,‖ and 
typically counterforce involves an attempt to push out the colonizer (Kohn & McBride 
2011, 110). 
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While resistance does not occur in a vacuum, it is interesting that in Security, 
Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978 Michel Foucault 
asserts that ―if resistance were nothing more than the reverse image of power, it would 
not resist; in order to resist one must activate something ‗as inventive, as mobile, as 
productive‘ as power itself‖ (Foucault 2009, xxi). The inventive power of resistance is 
the greatest threat to the colonizer. Touching on the natural drive to resist in the face of 
oppression, Foucault defines resistance as being ―‗coextensive and absolutely 
contemporaneous‘ to power; resistances exist within the strategic field of relations of 
power and relations of power themselves only exist relative to a multiplicity of points of 
resistance‖ (Foucault 2009, xx). Since Foucault is not completely satisfied with the term 
―resistance,‖ he posits a new term: ―counter-conduct.‖ This term is interesting in what it 
adds to resistance, as a concept: counter-conduct, building upon the notion of resistance, 
adds ―an explicitly ethical component‖ and the ability ―to move easily between the 
ethical and the political‖ (Foucault 2009, xxi). Foucault settles on the term ―counter-
conduct‖ (as opposed to possible alternatives such as ―misconduct‖) because it has the 
―sole advantage of allowing reference to the active sense of the word ‗conduct‘—counter-
conduct in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others; 
which is why I prefer it to ‗misconduct (inconduite)‘, which only refers to the passive 
sense of the word, of behavior: not conducting oneself properly‖ (Foucault 2009, 201). 
What Foucault is stressing here is the active sense of counter-conduct – it is an attempt 
not to reduce it to a passive and involuntary response to oppression. Additionally, 
because it is active, counter-conduct is inventive and adapts to whatever form the 
resistors deem best to achieve their goals. The best way to achieve independence may not 
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be to push out the colonizer. In Cabral‘s mind national liberation was only achieved when 
―national productive forces are completely free of all kinds of foreign domination‖ 
(Cabral 1994, 56). Often, even once the colonizer had physically left the previously 
colonized territory, foreign domination continued by other means and ―independence‖ 
was only illusory. 
Foucault touches on the natural disposition of people to resist unjust treatment and 
oppression. Similarly, Amilcar Cabral defines struggle as ―not exclusively apply[ing] to 
organized resistance or violence…. He points out that struggle is not necessarily a 
revolutionary condition; instead it is the natural condition of people, of all objects on the 
earth‖ (Kohn & McBride 2011, 110). As a natural response to oppression, the Palestinian 
resistance movement has ―situat[ed] itself as an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist liberation 
struggle like others in the Third World,‖ (Sayigh 1979, 7). The form resistance would 
take, however, not as obvious as the fact that it will occur, as ―every colonial context did 
produce different responses and strategies of resistance‖ (Kohn & McBride 2011, 4). It is 
the inventive power of resistance alluded to by Foucault that explains this variance. As 
Williams and Chrisman note, campaigns of resistance take many forms, ―ranging from 
legal and diplomatic manouevres… to wars of independence‖ (Chrisman & Williams 
1994, 3). Andreas Glaeser says that ―human beings are always completely absorbed in 
the social context in which they find themselves in any particular instant,‖ and I believe 
that it is in response to this social context that resistance takes shape (Glaeser 2000, 332). 
Therefore, it is in the specific context produced by oppression that resistance takes form, 
and it must take whichever form would best insure the freedom and well-being of those 
resisting. 
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 Amilcar Cabral and Franz Fanon are ―grouped together as postcolonial thinkers 
because of their common endorsement of revolutionary violence‖ (Kohn & McBride 
2011, 107). Asserting that violence embodies taking control of one‘s life and exercising 
agency, ―Fanon believed violence allows the previously colonized person to begin to be 
an agent instead of an object or victim in her history‖ (Kohn & McBride 2011, 107). 
According to Kohn and McBride, ―Fanon sees violence as providing a rupture with past 
psychology because it provides for a physical release of the internalized violence of 
colonialism, thereby creating a new trajectory of history and personality‖ (Kohn& 
McBride 2011, 69).  
Similarly, Cabral endorsed violence ―as a way of interrupting the progression of 
history in a given space;‖ in other words, ―he believed in revolution in order to free the 
land and its inhabitants from external control‖ (Kohn & McBride 2011, 107). According 
to Cabral:  
The important thing is to decide what forms of violence have to be used by the national 
liberation forces, in order not only to answer the violence of imperialism but also to 
ensure, through the struggle, the final victory of the cause, that is true national 
independence (Cabral quoted in Kohn & McBride 2011, 109).  
 
However it is not certain that violent resistance is the best way to achieve the final victory 
of the cause. Cabral states that ―armed liberation struggle requires the mobilization and 
organization of a significant majority of the population… [and] the efficient use of 
modern arms and of other means of war‖ (Cabral 1994, 64). He does not recognize that 
armed liberation is difficult, if not impossible, when the power disparity between the 
resister and the oppressor is so great that the resistance cannot employ efficient use of 
arms. Under these circumstances, armed resistance may not be an option. In fact, in a 
lecture he gave at UCLA titled Settler Colonialism Past and Present, Joel Beinin said 
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that there are many examples of armed struggle against settler colonialism, but this 
method is rarely successful (Beinin 2011).  
 Following this logic, resistance is not always violent and outward. Though James 
C. Scott mentions that there is an ideological struggle ―which underwrites resistance,‖ his 
book Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance focuses on everyday 
forms of resistance, or the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups (Scott 1985, 
xvii). According to Scott, all historical resistance by subordinate classes begins ―close to 
the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful realities of daily experience‖ 
(Scott 1985, 348). In fact, he asserts that ―[m]ost of the forms this struggle takes stop well 
short of collective outright defiance‖ and peasants ―typically avoid any direct symbolic 
confrontation with authority or with elite norms‖ (Scott 1985, 29). Instead they engage in 
―a quiet evasion that is equally massive and often far more effective‖ (Scott 1985, 32). 
 Resistance might also follow a middle ground between outright violence and quiet 
evasion. Hegemonic power consists of ―frameworks [from which] the individual detaches 
himself… without being able to escape them and can henceforth only try to outwit them‖ 
(de Certeau 1984, xxiv). The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories mirrors this 
hegemonic framework: Palestinians cannot escape Israeli expansion without abandoning 
their homeland, so they must find a way to outwit it. According to Michel de Certeau, the 
practice of everyday life concerns ―the ingenious ways in which the weak make use of 
the strong‖ (de Certeau 1984, xvii). In order to protect their human rights, Palestinians 
must find a way to make use of the Israeli power structure. Everyday life consists of 
having the power ―of turning the tables on the powerful by the way in which they made 
use of the opportunities offered by the particular situation‖ (de Certeau 1984, xx). The 
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situation in Palestine is embodied by an expansionist colonial state and the creation of 
Palestinian Bantustans, an outcome I will discuss further later in the paper. As one of my 
favorite quotes graffitied on the Israeli separation barrier states: ―To exist is to resist.‖ 
Resistance is a tactic, and ―[t]he space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must 
play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power…. it 
is a maneuver ‗written within the enemy‘s field of vision‘…. It operates in isolated 
actions, blow by blow‖ (de Certeau 1984, 37). As such, resistance must use its inventive 
power to overcome the oppressor. As Michel de Certeau says, ―[m]any everyday 
practices… are tactical in character. And so are… victories of the ‗weak‘ over the 
‗strong‘‖ (de Certeau 1984, xix). In order for Palestinians to be victorious in their 
resistance they must utilize new and unexpected tactics. 
_______________ 
Summary 
 Understanding the significance of sovereignty, territoriality and the predominance 
of the nation-state system will help me make sense of Israeli expansionism through the 
construction of the security barrier and the cantonization of West Bank Palestinians. 
From the literature review I infer that a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ would fit accepted 
models of statehood by erasing the ―fuzzy space‖ that is the Palestinian territories and 
replacing it with clearly defined Palestinian Bantustans surrounded by Israeli sovereign 
territory. This ―state‖ would have international legal sovereignty without ever having 
Westphalian sovereignty, and would allow the State of Israel to maximize its territorial 
annexation without being responsible for the Palestinian people.  
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 The discussion of resistance will lead to an exploration of a new tactic in 
Palestinian counter-conduct: a push for complete Israeli annexation of the oPt to head off 
the creation of a non-sovereign and territorial discontinuous Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ 
that would not provide for Palestinian rights.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
This project is significant, in part, because the Israeli-Palestinian struggle ―might 
be regarded as the quintessential struggle of the modern age‖ (Gelvin 2005, 2007, ix). 
Though the conflict takes place on a relatively small piece of land, it has been 
significantly long-lived, lasting for over a century (Gelvin 2005, 2007, i). The 
construction of the security barrier between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
is yet another phase of this hundred year war, part and parcel of a long history of conflict 
and colonization in Israel-Palestine as it ―furthers Israel‘s decades-old expansionist 
objectives by controlling land, corralling the Palestinian population into disconnected 
cantons, and preventing the emergence of a viable, independent Palestinian political 
entity in the West Bank‖ (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 339). 
In the literature review I ultimately concluded that, in the nation-state system, 
territoriality is a strategy for exercising (Westphalian) sovereignty over a geographic 
space. In the data and discussion of findings section of my thesis I support my assertion 
that Israeli expansion and construction of the ―security‖ barrier represent Israel‘s use of 
territoriality to exercise sovereign power over the West Bank by tracing the meandering 
path of the barrier and continued settlement expansion in the West Bank. To do this I 
utilize United Nations reports and several secondary sources that describe the route the 
barrier takes, carving deep into the West Bank. Statistics on the length and route of the 
wall will clearly show that it does not follow the Green Line (the internationally 
recognized border between Israel and the Palestinian territories). I also make use of the 
International Court of Justice‘s advisory opinion on the barrier. Several secondary 
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sources cited here explain that the barrier does not serve security purposes, and may in 
fact hinder the security of Israeli citizens.  
After providing evidence that the wall does not serve a security purpose (citing 
retired Israeli generals, UN reports and several notable scholars) I show that its path is 
instead aimed at encompassing the settlements, territorial annexation and the creation of 
Palestinian Bantustans. To back up these claims I again use reports by the United Nations 
as well as several reputable secondary sources. The data and discussion of findings 
section is also interspersed with several comments made to directly me by Palestinian, 
Israeli and international activists, scholars, political party representatives, refugees, 
students, settlers and even government figures during my time in Israel and the West 
Bank, from June 23 to July 30, 2011. These sources explain that the route of the wall 
goes around the majority of the settlements, and around the largest settlements, and even 
goes wide of them to allow for future settlement growth. Several sources here will also 
assert that expansion of settlements and population dispersal are strategies long utilized 
by Israel for controlling land. The major irony here is that an illegal wall (according to 
the ICJ) is being used to encompass illegal settlements (since the occupying power is 
legally prohibited from transferring population into the occupied territory). The fact that 
the path of the barrier encompasses large settlement tracks and underground water 
resources shows that the path of the barrier is meant to permanently transfer land and 
other resources to the State of Israel. Using reports by the UN and other sources I also 
support my claim that the path of the barrier is intended to isolate Palestinians from one 
another in disconnected cantons. 
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Obviously I do not have Israeli policy documents stating that the purpose of the 
barrier is annexation and cantonization; rather, I am deducing that this is the policy 
behind the barrier based on the route the barrier follows: several sources state it does not 
serve a security purpose as it is being built and it clearly encompasses illegal Israeli West 
Bank settlements and vital natural resources. Additionally, a few sources have cited 
statements by Israeli officials that would lend credence to my claims concerning the 
barrier‘s purpose beyond providing security from suicide bombers. If the barrier was 
being built along the Green Line it would be more plausible that it is being constructed 
first and foremost to address Israeli security concerns; as it is emerging, however, I do 
not believe security is the primary objective of the barrier‘s construction. 
The trends and perspectives I am identifying in my critique of Israeli expansion 
into the West Bank are not meant to be representative of the entire Israeli population; in 
fact, I met with a number of Israeli citizens during my time in Israel who are very active 
politically in their own critique of the separation barrier and the occupation and who are 
promoting human rights for both Israelis and Palestinians. I do, however, stand by my 
observations concerning the ultimate goals of Israeli expansion and construction of the 
security barrier and believe that these goals are understood at a policy level and are not 
random or accidental effects of a ―security‖ barrier. 
My claim that the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ serves the interests 
of the State of Israel is supported, first, by the fact that Israel identifies as a Jewish State 
and the inclusion of a large number of West Bank Palestinians into the state would 
destroy the demographic balance that makes that identity a reality; several sources cited 
in the data and discussion of findings section say as much. Therefore, the two-state 
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solution is supported by Israel with the adjustment that the resulting Palestinian ―state‖ 
will not be sovereign by Westphalian standards.
5
 Sources used here explain that the path 
of the barrier and settlement expansion, viewed from above, can be seen to outline what 
will become pockets of Palestinian land and isolated economic centers. Images showing 
the general outlines of the Palestinian Bantustans will also be utilized (such as Figure 1, 
below). 
To further support my claim that the goal of 
continued Israeli expansion and the construction of the 
separation barrier is the creation of a Palestinian 
Bantustan ―state‖ I outline other Israeli benefits of 
such an entity. For example there is the annexation to 
Israel of the majority of the West Bank to further the 
vision of ―Greater Israel‖. Second, as stated above, is 
the protection of the demographic balance in the 
Jewish State, which would be disrupted by the 
absorption of the West Bank Palestinians that would 
come with complete annexation of the West Bank. 
And third, terming this entity a ―state‖ would allow 
Israel to maintain sovereign power over the entire 
West Bank while passing the burden of the rights of 
Palestinians off onto the new Palestinian entity. The 
sources I use to support these claims show that the 
                                                          
5
 Refer to introduction for explanation.  
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path of the barrier annexes large sections of land, describe Israeli demographic fears, and 
show that Israel would maintain control over the whole of the West Bank.  
Also in the literature review I pointed out that anti-colonial resistance generally 
entails the colonized pushing back from the colonizer in an attempt to exercise 
sovereignty and determination as a separate entity. This is nearly impossible in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context due to Israeli expansion into the Palestinian territories. 
Recognizing that a Palestinian ―state‖ would not be sovereign, Palestinians have shifted 
tactics to press for complete annexation of the West Bank; the Palestinian population 
would be absorbed into the State of Israel where they could fight for their rights as Israeli 
citizens. First in the data and discussion of findings section on resistance I describe other 
forms of resistance utilized by Palestinians that follow the typical model of anti-colonial 
resistance: pushing back against the colonizer to create an independent space for self-
determination. Then, other sources used here explain that the two-state solution is ill-
advised and will entail the continuation of occupation under another guise. As Reuveny 
states, this would mean the creation of a Palestinian state without decolonization ever 
taking place; to address this reality Palestinians are aiming at achieving decolonization 
through annexation (Reuveny 2003). In Palestine, the push for annexation is making use 
of the strong ingeniously because the endgame (as being shaped by Israel) is clear: a 
Palestinian Bantustan state without Westphalian sovereignty. Rather than supporting 
independent Palestinian statehood, scholars such as Noam Chomsky argue for a kind of 
socialist binationalism which would better achieve the rights of the Palestinian people. 
While I am presenting the push for annexation as an interesting shift in anti-
colonial resistance tactics in Palestine, I cannot claim, much less prove, that the 
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Palestinian people as a whole support this move. This should be clear, first, by the other 
examples of counter-force outlined in the resistance section of the chapter on data and 
discussion of findings, and second, by the actions taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
in the United Nations this September. The move by the Palestinian Authority to 
unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood in the UN clearly shows that many Palestinians 
have not given up on having a state of their own (or at least that the PA hasn‘t). I address 
the PA‘s move to declare statehood in the chapter on data and discussion of findings, and 
cite sources there that claim such a move plays right into the hands of the Israelis, aiding 
in their creation of a Palestinian Bantustan state. Therefore, while this project is not able 
to examine the extent to which Palestinians, as a unity, are moving toward support of 
annexation as an anti-colonial tactic, it is important to understand that this tactic is being 
considered in some circles and may be the best option considering Israeli actions in the 
West Bank. This leaves an opening for future research to explore and compare the extent 
of resistance through annexation to other forms of more traditional resistance tactics. 
What this study does accomplish is to explore the relationship between 
territoriality and sovereignty and how the perception of that relationship drives Israeli 
expansion and construction of the security barrier in the West Bank. Furthermore, this 
study opens up a question about the nature of anti-colonial struggle; if pushing away from 
the colonizer (for example, by forming a state without decolonization) does not result in 
sovereign independence then resistance tactics must shift, perhaps to push for inclusion in 
the system that already exists. 
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Chapter 4: Data and Discussion of Findings 
Background 
Before beginning my argument, for readers less acquainted with Israel-Palestine, I 
include a working definition of both ―Israel‖ and ―Palestine,‖ as both are often contested 
entities, as well as a brief background of events relevant to my topic. Most scholars trace 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict‘s origins back to Palestine under the Ottoman Empire and 
the birth of modern Zionism in Europe, and would say that the conflict between Israel 
and Palestine boils down to a conflict over territory. Though hard to pin down an exact 
date, this conflict first began, roughly, with the Jewish aliyot (waves of immigration) 
between 1882 and the onset of WWII (Gelvin 2005, 2007, 56). Historically, this conflict 
has not been isolated to Israelis and Palestinians, but has directly involved the Arab states 
in the region, the United States, the United Nations and other Western and non-Western 
states. For the purposes of this thesis, I will trace the conflict from the creation of the 
State of Israel in 1948 and will focus on the major land-transfers (usually through war) 
since that time.  
The State of Israel came into existence with the 1948 War, known to Israelis as 
the ―War of Independence,‖ and to Palestinians as ―al-Nakba‖ (the catastrophe). Prior to 
the war, the United Nations had put forward a partition plan for the creation of two states: 
one Jewish and one Palestinian. This plan was not accepted by the Palestinian 
representatives due to the perception that the allocation of lands and resources was unfair 
and disproportional to population size. During the 1948 War, the newly-declared state of 
Israel claimed even more land than had been allocated by the (already disproportionate) 
UN partition plan. The armistice agreement reached by Israel and its Arab-state 
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neighbors following the war created the 1949 Armistice Line, or Green Line, which is the 
internationally recognized border of the state of Israel.  
Skipping ahead a bit, in 1993 the first protocol of the Oslo Accords called for 
letters of mutual recognition to be exchanged between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. 
In his letter, Arafat recognized the state of Israel, therefore conceding that the pre-1967 
borders of Israel are non-negotiable – that the land claimed by Israel in 1948 is forever 
lost to the Palestinians. Therefore, all future negotiations over the border between Israel 
and a future Palestinian state would concern the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories 
(Gelvin 2005, 2007, 234). This will serve as my working definition of ―Israel‖ and 
―Palestine‖ – Israeli land is that to the west of the 1949 armistice line (Green Line), and 
the Palestinian territories 
consist of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.  
In 1967, Israel and its 
neighbors went to war again 
(the Six Day War/Arab-
Israeli War), and Israel 
gained military control over 
the Golan Heights, the Gaza 
Strip, the Sinai Peninsula 
and the West Bank. Israel 
annexed East Jerusalem and 
the Golan, eventually 
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returned Sinai to Egypt, and has occupied Gaza and the West Bank ever since. Settlement 
expansion in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) began in 1967 following the Arab-
Israeli War, despite the fact that the occupation and transfer of Israeli population into the 
Palestinian Territories is illegal and often criticized under international law.  
Construction of the ―security barrier‖ in the West Bank was approved in 2000 and 
in April 2002 the Israeli government announced that it would begin construction of the 
barrier, the stated purpose of which was to provide security to Israeli citizens from 
suicide bombers who infiltrated Israel from the West Bank (United Nations 2009; Cook 
& Hanieh 2006; Parry 2011; Gelvin 2005, 2007). The International Court of Justice 
―affirmed that the settlement of Israeli citizens in the oPt is illegal, and found that ‗the 
wall‘s sinuous route has been traced in such a way as to include within that area the great 
majority of the Israeli settlements in the oPt,‘‖ a fact that has been largely ignored as 
construction of the wall continues unabated (United Nations 2009, 6). Israelis call the 
structure a ―security fence,‖ Palestinians call it a ―separation wall,‖ but either way it 
follows a highly controversial route: 
Instead of adhering to the 1949 armistice lines that had served as Israel‘s unofficial 
border for over half a century, the barrier – which will eventually consist of a 450-mile 
stretch of concrete walls, electronic fences, barbed-wire fences, and trenches – sometimes 
cuts deeply into the occupied areas and incorporates the largest of the West Bank 
settlement blocs as well as Jerusalem (Gelvin 2005, 2007, 247).  
 
According to a UN report, once completed approximately 85% of the route of the barrier 
will run inside the West Bank and East Jerusalem rather than along the Green Line 
(United Nations 2009, 4). In fact, the barrier runs deep inside the West Bank in order to 
surround ―80 Israeli settlements, which will be located between the Barrier and the Green 
Line‖ (United Nations 2009, 12). The Israeli government states that ―the protection of 
Israeli settlers and settlements against Palestinian violence is an additional objective of 
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the Barrier,‖ which is why it encircles the settlements (United Nations 2009, 12). This, in 
itself, is highly controversial, since construction of the settlements in the West Bank 
violates international law, just as the path of the barrier has been deemed to do. In 
addition to encircling the settlements, the wall also ―loops far inward from the boundary 
between the West Bank and Israel, cutting Palestinians off from water sources, land and 
communities‖ – controlling vital land and water resources for the use of Israelis and to 
the detriment of Palestinians (Erickson 2008, 22). 
As stated above, the barrier follows a highly contested route: ―Palestinians, 
human rights groups, and most of the international community have condemned the 
construction of the barrier for a number of reasons,‖ including the fact that the barrier 
creates a revised starting point 
for any future negotiations of the 
conflict, the fact that it requires 
the uprooting of Palestinians 
whose land is then confiscated, 
the fact that it cuts off some 
Palestinian villages from the rest 
of the West Bank, and the fact 
that it separates towns from the 
land they farm (Gelvin 2005, 
2007, 247-8; Erickson 2008, 22). In fact, some critics go so far as to suggest that the 
barrier represents ―the first step of a kinder, gentler form of ethnic cleansing‖ (Gelvin 
2005, 2007, 248).  
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has declared that ―Israel‘s construction of 
a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, [is] 
contrary to international law and should cease forthwith‖ (Sands 2006, 18). The UN 
report mentioned earlier quotes the ICJ‘s advisory opinion at length: 
Whilst the Court notes the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the wall 
does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary nature, it nevertheless 
cannot remain indifferent to certain fears expressed to it that the route of the wall will 
prejudge the future frontier between Israel and Palestine, and the fear that Israel may 
integrate the settlements and their means of access. The Court considers that the 
construction of the wall and its associated regime create a ‗fait accompli‘ on the ground 
that could become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal 
characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation (ICJ, 
Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
of 9 July 2004, para. 121, quoted in United Nations 2009, 40).  
 
The ICJ recognizes that, though Israel insists that the wall is temporary,
6
 it actually 
represents de facto annexation of Palestinian land and a revised starting point for 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Based on this assessment, the 
ICJ has declared the wall to be in violation of international law. William Parry describes 
the ICJ‘s Advisory Opinion on the barrier, saying that it ―unequivocally stated that the 
route of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian territory is illegal under international law‖ 
and ―[w]as overwhelmingly backed by a UN General Assembly Resolution‖ (Parry 2011, 
12; Hammami & Tamari 2006, 271). A representative of Kadima youth said this of the 
advisory opinion: ―The 2004 ICJ advisory opinion was rather problematic and beyond the 
mandate of the ICJ. I believe most Israelis won‘t accept it‖ (From personal notes: youth 
                                                          
6
 A Kadima youth representative in Israel once said to me: ―Eventually the wall can be moved… the wall is 
nice [laughing], the wall can come down. It is just a wall. It was never meant to be the future border.‖ 
(From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). Later a Palestinian man in Bethlehem 
asked me if I thought the wall would ever come down, and I told him I hoped so. He said he was sure the 
wall will come down – ―the wall will come down when Israel annexes all of Palestine and there is no need 
for a wall anymore,‖ he said. (From personal notes: Bethlehem, Palestine). Obviously the ICJ does not 
believe the wall will be moved, despite Israel‘s assurances to the contrary, and I do not believe (as the man 
in Bethlehem asserted) that Israel wants to annex all of Palestine – just as much of the land as possible 
while excluding the people. 
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representative, Kadima party, Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). Whether 
Israelis accept it or not, most of the international community is in agreement about the 
illegality of the construction and path of the barrier. 
Voicing his frustration over the inaction of the international community during 
the continued construction of the illegal barrier, Parry points out that after six years of 
underwhelming inaction by the international community, Israel ―rubbished the ICJ‘s 
ruling and continues to build the Wall with impunity; our governments, which the ICJ 
said are obliged to help enforce its decision, remain complicit through their silence and 
inaction‖ (Parry 2011, 12). International law apparently doesn‘t apply to Israel, and 
despite overwhelming support for the ICJ‘s advisory opinion, there are no teeth to 
enforce it. 
_______________ 
Security (or not) 
Construction of the ―separation wall‖ in the West Bank began in 2002, and 
despite Israeli assertions that the wall is being constructed for security reasons, I believe, 
as many scholars do, that ―security is being invoked simply as a disguise for territorial 
ambitions‖ (Chomsky 2003, 26). In other words, its construction is aimed at an expansion 
of power in the name of security. From the literature review it is clear that territoriality 
aims at controlling people and phenomena by delimiting and asserting control over a 
geographic area, which seems to be the real motive behind the path of the barrier. Even 
the International Court of Justice stated that ―the infringements resulting from that route 
cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of security or public 
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order,‖ they can, however, be explained as an attempt to exercise authority and annex 
large sections of the West Bank (United Nations 2009, 6). 
Don‘t misunderstand; security is a legitimate concern for any community. 
According to Vern Neufeld Redekop in his book about human identity needs, ―[t]he 
degree of security one needs is a result of fear, which is itself a function of past 
experiences‖ (Redekop 2002, 40). An Israeli student I met at Hebrew University retold 
her experiences with terror bombings and fear, saying that ―it is embedded in Israeli 
minds – everyone you meet knows someone who died‖ (From personal notes: Bikhal, 
Hebrew University student, Hebrew University, Israel, June 29, 2011). She also spoke 
out openly against the occupation and construction of the barrier, tempering her statement 
by saying that every Palestinian has a story like that, too. Another Israeli I met, a settler 
from Gush Etzion, expressed a similar feeling of fear (though he disregarded the 
possibility that Palestinians might also be suffering) saying: ―We see terror all around us‖ 
(From personal notes: settler, Gush Etzion, Israel, June 27, 2011). 
While I do not deny that Israel‘s experience with suicide bombings increases 
public fear, and therefore the need for a feeling of security, I do think that the wall plays 
on Israeli fears without providing real protection. Catherine Cook and Adam Hanieh 
support this assessment, stating that construction of the barrier ―[capitalizes] on the 
Israeli public‘s fear of Palestinian suicide bombings and other attacks on Israeli 
civilians,‖ allowing Israel to unilaterally expand its borders uninhibited (Cook & Hanieh 
2006, 347). ―Security‖ is being invoked to justify expansionist goals. 
Additionally, though terrorism is a legitimate concern, the possibility that 
terrorism is ―merely a symptom‖ of Israeli colonialism would suggest that the wall 
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actually endangers Israelis by creating desperate conditions that lead some people to 
commit desperate acts (Reuveny 2003, 370). At the Dheish Refugee Camp in West Bank, 
Palestine, I met a girl who said that for every action there is a reaction – the pressure on 
Palestinians living under the occupation builds. Referring to violent resistance strategies 
she said, ―there is a root cause for everything... I‘m not justifying it‖ (From personal 
notes: Ibdaa Cultural Center, Dheish Refugee Camp, June 28, 2011). For Palestinians, 
―the settlements symbolize the Israeli occupation and fuel Palestinian nationalism and 
hostility toward Israel‖ – they see their land being annexed while they are forced into 
isolated enclaves and they have limited options for recourse (Reuveny 2003, 366). As 
Noam Chomsky explains, terror is ―a weapon of the weak and the desperate which may 
continue to plague Israeli life‖ as long as the occupation and Israeli expansion persists 
(Chomsky 2003, 99). A group of Israeli youths who signed a letter to Ariel Sharon 
explaining why they refuse to join the IDF feel that ―the occupation is not only immoral; 
but it also damages the security of Israel‘s citizens and residents [due to terrorist attacks 
that are a result of Palestinian desperation]. Such security will be achieved only through a 
just peace between Israelis and Palestinians‖ that negates the need for desperate action 
(Beinin & Stein 2006, 184). Chomsky reinforces this sentiment, stating: ―In the long run, 
Israel‘s security rests on relations with its neighbors,‖ and the expansion policy that 
increases long-term and short-term threats by poisoning these relations only further 
endangers Israeli citizens (Chomsky 2003, 26). 
In addition to creating a desperate situation that becomes a breeding ground for 
terrorism, the wall hinders security tactically as well. Some retired Israeli generals have 
expressed that ―[t]he present path of the fence… was a trap for [Israeli] soldiers‖ (Trottier 
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2007, 111). According to these generals, if the purpose of the wall were truly to provide 
physical/military security it would follow a path ―as close as possible to the Green Line, 
and one that follows the shortest route‖ (Trottier 2007, 111). This is not the case, as the 
Green Line is only 315 km long while the wall will be 709 km long once completed – not 
nearly running along the armistice line (Parry 2011, 11). In fact,  
[a]s it has emerged, with a serpentine shape dictated by political compromises between 
various Israeli actors, the separation fence does not serve a military logic. It often runs 
deep in valleys, instead of on the highest points. It weaves intricately in the landscape, 
creating real traps for soldiers. It includes fences where passage may be reduced, but still 
persists. Pipes run under it, thereby allowing for it eventually to be blown up. It 
constitutes a general‘s nightmare, as several generals have argued in Israeli courts. It 
certainly does not prevent rocket attacks (Trottier 2007, 126, emphasis added). 
 
Tactically speaking, the wall is clearly not a model of military efficiency and safety, and 
one would think that when it comes to national security Israel might put more stock in the 
recommendations of its own experienced generals. Reserve General Mattityahu Peled, 
one of the most outspoken critics of the annexation policy (of which the wall is a major 
part), ―has explained over and over again that the new 1967 boundaries did not increase 
the security of Israel…. Those who make a fetish of security, he argues, have been 
concerned ‗not with Israel‘s security but with her territorial dimensions‘‖ (Chomsky 
2003, 24). General Peled sees clearly that the Israeli expansion policy exercises 
territoriality in order to annex and assert sovereignty over the West Bank. 
Professor John Dugard, former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, asserts that ―[t]he 75 km Wall being built in East 
Jerusalem is an instrument of social engineering designed to achieve the Judaization of 
Jerusalem by reducing the number of Palestinians in the city. The Wall is being built 
through Palestinian neighborhoods, separating Palestinians from Palestinians, in a 
manner that cannot conceivably be justified on security grounds‖ (quoted in Parry 2011, 
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139). Jeff Halper, whom I met in Israel, claims that ―the separation barrier takes on the 
coloring of a political border rather than a defense mechanism. That is the only way to 
explain its tortuous route deep into Palestinian areas rather than along the 1967 line‖ 
(Halper 2006, 70). This political barrier is aimed at the territorial maximization of the 
State of Israel at the expense of the native Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank. 
Many Palestinians, such as Abu Omar, a Palestinian farmer from Jayyous, agree with this 
assessment; Abu Omar believes that ―[t]his Wall has nothing to do with security… Israel 
simply wants our land without us‖ (Abu Omar quoted in Parry 2011, 99). The goal of 
annexing the land while avoiding annexing the Palestinian population will be discussed 
further below. 
Overall, it would appear that while Israel claims that expansion and construction 
of the barrier can be explained and justified on security grounds, ―a review of the facts 
suggests that the annexation policy is to be explained on other grounds‖ (Chomsky 2003, 
22-23; Parry 2011, 12). Expansion is more concerned with territorial aspirations, 
demographic fears and Palestinian ―statehood.‖ 
_______________ 
What the Barrier Does Accomplish 
 Catherine Cook and Adam Hanieh suggest that despite the official explanation 
that the barrier is a ―security‖ measure ―the structure‘s meandering path betrays 
underlying territorial objectives‖ (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 338). Chomsky reiterates that 
settlement and expansion are not driven by security needs, and suggests that the 
annexation policy must be explained on other grounds (Chomsky 2003, 10). I agree, and 
think that the barrier ultimately accomplishes three goals: (1) encompassing the 
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settlements to ensure the territorial contiguity of the State of Israel; (2) annexing the 
maximum amount of Palestinian territory (without annexing the Palestinian people); and 
(3) creating a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ that will allow Israel to maintain sovereignty 
in all of historic Palestine.  
As noted in a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territory: ―The protection of Israeli settlements, 
including areas planned for their future expansion, constituted the major factor for the 
deviation of the Barrier‘s route from the Green Line‖ (United Nations 2010, 2). This is 
ironic because the meandering path of the barrier that deviates from the Green Line 
violates international law (according to the ICJ) and the settlements that its serpentine 
path encompasses also violate international law (Parry 2011; Sands 2006; United Nations 
2009). Parry highlights this farce when he explains that the reason for the circuitous route 
of the barrier is to ensure that 80 of the more sizeable and significant colonies (housing 
385,000 settlers and all of which were established illegally on Palestinian land that Israel 
has illegally occupied for over 40 years) will be on the west side of the wall (Parry 2011, 
11).  
It is essential to Israeli expansion that the settlements are protected because in a 
competition between Jews and Arabs for control of the land ―[e]stablishing settlements 
[provides] a way of defending territorial claims‖ (Evans 2006, 579). The idea is to plant 
enough Israelis in the West Bank so that the land would be unofficially annexed to Israel 
– the wall being the next step in this process of de facto annexation by encompassing the 
settlements. According to Matt Evans, ―Israel‘s population dispersal policy is one of the 
longest ongoing attempts to defend territorial sovereignty by directing population 
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settlement to areas of strategic national importance‖ (Evans 2006, 578). As explained in 
the literature review, territory is the common denominator in definitions of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty means absolute authority within a territorial space, and population dispersal 
is one way of controlling territory through de facto annexation. 
Not only will the wall‘s path ensure that the settlements and the land they are built 
on is annexed to Israel, but ―[t]he path of the wall incorporates the planned expansion 
areas of various settlements – rather than built-up areas alone – with the effect of 
capturing land for future settlement growth‖ (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 344). Therefore, the 
path of the wall doesn‘t stop once security for the settlers is achieved, but again clearly 
embodies a land grab aimed at the maximization of Israeli sovereign territory. 
Commenting on the absurdity of building an illegal wall around illegal settlements in 
order to protect them, Yiftachel states that ―more Palestinian land is now illegally seized, 
to protect settlements, which illegally seized Palestinian land in the first place!‖ 
(Yiftachel 2004, 608). The security barrier is another step towards annexation. 
Building on the encompassment of the settlements, the barrier‘s circuitous route is 
motivated by the de facto annexation to Israel of large sections of Palestinian land in the 
West Bank. Recognizing this process, Cook and Hanieh refer to the barrier as ―a 
unilateral political boundary demarcating territories slated for annexation to Israel‖ (Cook 
& Hanieh 2006, 345). Territorial control allows Israeli to exercise effective sovereignty 
in the oPt – control that is achieved, in part, through annexation. As William Parry states 
in his book Against the Wall: The Art of Resistance in Palestine, ―West Bank Palestinians 
have been losing land and rights illegally to Israel‘s colonies for over four decades, and 
are now losing more land via the Wall – another Israeli project deemed illegal under 
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international law – so that Israel can annex this colonized territory and unilaterally 
impose a new, larger border‖ (Parry 2011, 11). The goal is to annex as much of the land 
as possible without absorbing the Palestinian people into the Jewish State.
7
 Once 
completed, about 85 percent of the wall will be built on West Bank land, and its route 
will annex 10 percent of the West Bank to Israel; according to Palestinians, this 
―insidious path… is a de facto land grab by Israel‖ (Parry 2011, 11).  
Richard Falk explains that rather than serving a military function Israeli 
settlements and the security barrier ―represent an undisguised plan to shift resources and 
effective sovereignty from the inhabitants to the settlers‖ – a major goal of settler 
colonialism (Falk 2003, 126). Since shifting sovereignty is the goal of Israeli colonialism 
and sovereignty is exercised within a specific territory, annexation is a logical means to 
this end. As stated by Patrick Wolfe, ―[t]erritoriality is settler colonialism‘s specific, 
irreducible element‖ (Wolfe 2006, 388). In this dynamic, settler colonialism in Israel-
Palestine is insatiable: it always needs more land (Wolfe 2006, 395). Joel Beinin believes 
that the barrier‘s trajectory ―could ultimately annex as much as half of the West Bank,‖ 
and, combined with continuing land confiscations and the construction of bypass roads, 
draws the boundaries ―for potential Palestinian ‗Bantustans‘‖ (Beinin 2006, 35).  This 
brings us to the final purpose of the wall: the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖. 
The culminating task accomplished by encircling the settlements and annexing 
large segments of West Bank land is the creation of fragmented and isolated Palestinian 
Bantustans. The goal of the wall, ultimately, is the destruction of the territorial contiguity 
of Palestine while maintaining the territorial contiguity of lands occupied by Israel since 
1967 (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 345). Jeff Halper notes that, through called a ―security 
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 More about annexation and Israeli demographic fears below. 
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barrier,‖ the wall actually separates Palestinians from Palestinians, preventing them from 
forming a unified political entity (From personal notes: Jeff Halper, ICAHD, East 
Jerusalem, Israel, June 24, 
2011). A Gush Etzion settler 
who gave an informal lecture 
while I was in Israel opened his 
talk by telling us about a 
Japanese game in which the 
players use black and white 
counters in order to surround 
their opponent and win the 
game (From personal notes: 
settler, Gush Etzion, Israel, June 
27, 2011). He compared this to 
what is happening between Jews 
and Arabs in the area 
surrounding the settlement in 
the West Bank where he lives. I 
suppose he was trying to explain 
the Israeli strategy of 
cantonization by which Israel 
encircles each Palestinian 
pocket with Israeli settlements 
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and/or with the barrier in order to ―win‖ the territorial game. This encirclement of 
Palestinian pockets is exactly what is occurring in the West Bank. 
A report by the UN states that the barrier is ―one of the key components in the 
continuing fragmentation of West Bank territory‖ (United Nations 2009, 12). The path of 
the barrier is no accident; rather, the wall ―cements a topography of geographically 
disconnected Palestinian population centers, cut off from one another and from their 
sources of livelihood‖ – a collection of isolated Bantustans (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 340). 
The modern conception of a world made up of clearly bounded territorial nation-states 
aids Israel in this task. If the map is composed of flat, neat surfaces that are clearly 
separated from each other the blurred line of the border between Israel and the Palestinian 
territories does not fir this model (Malkki 1992, 26). Israel created the blurred line 
through continuous territorial expansion beyond the Green Line, and now it will define it 
– created a clearly delineated (if non-sovereign) Palestinian ―state‖ in the form of a 
collection of isolated (but neatly bounded) cantons.  
I disagree with authors who assert that the wall has ―destroyed the prospect of a 
two-state solution to the conflict‖ (Parry 2011, 12). Rather, the wall is another step 
toward a two-state solution which will result in Israel possessing the majority of the 
Palestinian territories and surrounding a series of Palestinian Bantustans which comprise 
―independent statehood‖ in ―territorial fictions‖ (Tilley 2011). A two-state solution 
would, in fact, move forward despite the fact that the settlements and the barrier combine 
to make ―a politically and economically viable Palestinian state impossible‖ by cutting up 
the oPt into ―physically isolated cantons‖ (Parry 2011, 12). This ―state,‖ as envisioned by 
Israel, will consist of a collection of Bantustans reminiscent of apartheid South Africa 
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(Sussman 2006; 
Beinin 2006; Halper 
2006). And far from 
being shy about 
Israel‘s intentions, 
―Bantustans‖ is 
exactly the term 
used by Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon to describe 
the future for 
Palestine (Parry 2011, 11).  
Redolent of the Japanese game described by the Gush Etzion settler, Dr. Iyad 
Barghouti, General Director of the Ramallah Center of Human Rights Studies,
8
 describes 
the oPt as a chessboard:  
The geography of Palestinian land has changed. One can hardly find a Palestinian village 
or city not surrounded by one or more settlements. The landscape has become similar to a 
chessboard and the creation of an independent and real Palestinian state has become 
impossible (Barghouti 2011, 19, emphasis added).  
 
The outcome, instead, will be a non-sovereign fiction termed a ―state,‖ and since states 
are conceptually sovereign and responsible for the well-being of their own citizens Israeli 
will no longer be held responsible for the rights of the Palestinian people (not that Israel 
ever accepted its responsibilities as occupier). Cook and Hanieh project that the wall will 
―confine the majority of the Palestinian population of the West Bank into three large 
                                                          
8
 I interned at the Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies (RCHRS) with Dr. Iyad for one month in the 
summer of 2011 while living in Ramallah. 
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cantons comprising some 50 percent of the West Bank‘s territory‖ (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 
339). The rest of the land will be permanently annexed to the State of Israel, which will 
surround and effectively control these cantons. 
Israel‘s end game is to create enough facts on the ground that Palestinians will be 
―compelled to accept a ‗state‘ made up of a series of Bantustans‖ (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 
346). The most urgent mission of apartheid South Africa was the same, ―getting the 
indigenous people to declare statehood in non-sovereign enclaves‖ (Tilley 2011). Though 
in apartheid South Africa this mission ―finally collapsed with mass black revolt and took 
apartheid down with it,‖ the supreme irony for Palestinians today is that ―the Palestinian 
leadership now is not only walking right into the same trap but actually making a claim 
on it‖ by going to the UN to unilaterally declare statehood (Tilley 2011).  Rather than 
being compelled to accept a ―state‖ made up of isolated Bantustans, by declaring 
independent statehood Palestinians are backing themselves into a place where Israel can 
say ―as you are, you are now a state‖ (Tilley 2011). This perfectly serves Israel‘s goal to 
create a territorially discontinuous Palestinian Bantustan state in the West Bank on 
whatever resource-scarce land Israel does not claim when annexing the majority of the 
West Bank territory. 
The path of the barrier points to how ―Israeli territorial control divides, splits, and 
fragments the West Bank into separate Palestinian-controlled blocks that lack any 
territorial continuity,‖ and the emerging Palestinian state will be modeling accordingly 
(Leuenberger & Schnell 2010, 829). Iyad Barghouti expresses the Palestinian national 
cause as putting an end to the occupation (Barghouti 2011, 21). Yet under the present 
circumstances (given the facts on the ground), a declaration of Palestinian statehood 
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―raises the clearest danger to the Palestinian national movement in its entire history‖ 
(Tilley 2011). The cantonization achieved by the barrier and settlements aims for the 
creation of ―nominal ‗states‘ without genuine sovereignty,‖ and the worst thing 
Palestinians can do is declare independent statehood under this framework (Tilley 2011). 
It is clear, as a representative of Civic Coalition
9
 claims, that the wall and the settlements 
are part of an elaborate system aimed at carving the West Bank into three main ghettos 
(From personal notes: Jamal, Civic Coalition, June 25, 2011). 
Noam Chomsky says that any vision of a future Palestinian state is ―approaching 
the level of South Africa forty years ago…. and the ‗homelands‘ (Bantustans) they 
established‖ (Chomsky 2003, xi). He explains that the establishment of a Palestinian state 
in the currently occupied areas would be under permanent military protection (i.e., 
occupation) and ―would be little other than a kind of Bantustan‖ (Chomsky 2003, 80). 
Commonly described within Israeli circles as the ―Bantustan solution,‖ Chomsky states 
that ―the goal of the Oslo negotiations is to establish a situation of ‗permanent 
neocolonial dependency‘ for the occupied territories‖ – colonization that would not end 
with the formation of a Palestinian ―state‖ (Chomsky 2003, 215). Rather, this would 
create the conditions necessary for the Palestinian Bantustans to become ―impoverished 
labor cesspools‖ without the essential resources for actual independence (Tilley 2011).  
A declaration of Palestinian statehood in the current framework will accomplish 
little for the Palestinian people in terms of protecting their rights, but a Palestinian 
Bantustan ―state‖ ensures a positive outcome for Israel in terms of achieving its goals. 
                                                          
9
 The Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians‘ Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ) is a nongovernmental 
nonprofit coalition of institutions, societies, associations and individuals with experience and mandate of 
working in the different fields of human rights. Website: http://www.civiccoalition-
jerusalem.org/ccdprj.ps/new2/index.php. 
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_______________ 
Benefits of a Palestinian “state” for Israel 
 In the past I would have agreed that Israel would never allow the creation of a 
Palestinian state because when I said state I was referring to an entity with the 
requirements of Westphalian sovereignty: ―territoriality and the exclusion of external 
actors from domestic authority structures‖ (Krasner 1999, 20). The creation of a 
Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ that merely possesses recognition (international legal 
sovereignty) serves many interests for Israel as it will essentially be a non-sovereign 
nominal entity termed a ―state‖ in order to free Israel from any obligations towards the 
Palestinian people and to avoid absorbing the Arab population. In fact, ―getting the 
Palestinians to declare statehood themselves allows Israel precisely the outcome that 
eluded the apartheid South African regime: voluntary native acceptance of 
‗independence‘ in a non-sovereign territory with no political capacity to alter its 
territorial boundaries or other essential terms of existence‖ (Tilley 2011). The Bantustans 
essentially maintain Israeli sovereignty over the whole of the West Bank while 
addressing Israeli demographic fears.  
Ever since the creation of the state in 1948 Israel has faced a demographic 
problem caused ―by the existence of Arabs in a Jewish state‖ (Chomsky 2003, 19). 
Though Israel would of course prefer to annex the whole of ―Greater Israel,‖10 a solution 
had to be reached that solved the demographic problem – a problem which would be 
exacerbated by the inclusion of West Bank Palestinians into the State of Israel 
(Palestinians who, despite Israel‘s best efforts, refused to leave their homes and, say, go 
                                                          
10
 ―Greater Israel‖ has several meanings of slight variation: the land stretching from the Jordan River to the 
sea; the whole of British mandatory Palestine; or (the most common definition today) the combined 
territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territories. 
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to Jordan).
11
 It was understood among Israeli officials that a substantial Arab population 
would likely ―destroy the foundations of our state‖ (Chomsky 2003, 105). Israel has long 
recognized ―the need to ‗separate and disengage‘ from the Palestinians in order to 
preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state‖ (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010, 818). 
An article in Ha‘aretz12 from September 4, 1973 stated that ―it will be possible to 
take over the territories without annexing them and without granting their inhabitants, the 
Arabs, the rights of citizens in Israel‖ (Chomsky 2003, 16). It is possible through the 
creation of a non-sovereign Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ which would allow maximum 
Israeli annexation of the territories without absorbing the Palestinian people. Without 
exacerbating the demographic problem, a ―‗Bantustan‘ model would maximize Israeli 
control of territory‖ through annexation and effective sovereignty over the Palestinian 
enclaves (Sussman 2006, 304). When I asked an Israeli student at Tel Aviv University 
how important it is that Israel be a Jewish state, she replied: ―It is essential‖ (From 
personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011).
13
 She went on to say that a 
one-state solution would not work, suggesting we ―need to get back to reality‖ – in 
reality, a Palestinian Bantustan state much better serves Israel‘s interests. 
Despite a significant amount of literature that suggests that a Palestinian state will 
never exist (Parry 2011),
14
 ―Israel wants and needs a Palestinian state so that it will not 
have to grant citizenship to three and a half million Palestinians‖ (Halper 2006, 70). Not 
disrupting the demographic balance of the Jewish State is the primary reason for 
                                                          
11
 As one Israeli university student told me, ―if they [the Palestinians] could go to Jordan I would support it 
but this is impossible‖ (From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011).  
12
 Ha-aretz is Israel‘s oldest daily newspaper. Website: http://www.haaretz.com/. 
13
 This was the same girl who said she would prefer it if Palestinians would ―go to Jordan.‖ 
14
 Possibly when this assertion is made it is because one does not conceive of a ―state‖ as a collection of 
non-sovereign isolated cantons. 
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abandoning the complete annexation of the West Bank in favor of the creation of 
Bantustans. Leuenberger and Schnell note that while Israel‘s goal has always involved a 
vision of Greater Israel, ―demographic concerns increasingly led to the recognition that 
some territorial compromises were in Israel‘s interest‖ (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010, 
825). These compromises are not in the favor of the Palestinian population. Chomsky 
predicts that ―[t]he Palestinian state is likely to be a kind of Bantustan, a reservoir of 
cheap labor, thus overcoming the fears of Israeli liberals that annexation would erode the 
Jewish character of the state, while perpetuating the conditions of economic dependence‖ 
(Chomsky 2003, 30). Cantonization will mean occupation under another name. 
 While resolving Israel‘s demographic fears, cantonization means the creation of a 
nominal Palestinian ‗state‘ while maintaining Israeli sovereignty over the whole of the 
West Bank. Chomsky postulates: ―Perhaps Israel will succeed – as it would of course 
prefer – to institute a liberal occupation policy and create tolerable material conditions for 
its Arab population…. with the establishment of a Palestinian state of some sort‖ 
(Chomsky 2003, 94). This possibility suggests several pending realities for Palestinians. 
First, though Israel will create a Palestinian state rather than absorb the Palestinian 
population into Israel, it will be a state ―of some sort‖ – in other words, it will not be 
viable or have Westphalian sovereignty but it will be officially recognized as a state 
anyway (the requirement of international legal sovereignty). Second, though a ―state‖ 
will be established, the occupation will continue – simply in another form and by another 
name. The goal of settlement expansion and construction of the security barrier is to 
―force [Palestinian] concession to a moribund entity termed a state,‖ thus arguing that 
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Israel ―has ended the occupation, but in a manner that will undeniably maintain it‖ (Roy 
2006, 287). Palestinian statehood is yet another tool of Israeli dominance. 
Though this Palestinian entity would not possess Westphalian sovereignty, ―[i]t 
would make sense for [Israel] to use the term ‗state‘ to refer to whatever scattered 
cantons they decide to leave to local Palestinian administration‖ (Chomsky 2003, 190). 
This is because, in the nation-state system, a Palestinian state would be responsible for 
the welfare of its own citizens, technically letting Israel off the hook for the desperate 
conditions created by the occupation. Ironically, a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ would fit 
accepted models of statehood by the mere fact that its boundaries would finally be 
cemented. However, according to Yiftachel what we are witnessing in the creation of the 
Palestinian Bantustan state is ―the making of political space marked by ‗neither two 
states, nor one‘, as Palestinians are left in the twilight zone between occupation and 
ghettoized self-rule‖ (Yiftachel 2004, 611). Palestinian cantons would not comprise a 
state in terms of Westphalian sovereignty, but would be termed as such anyway – it 
would instead be a Palestinian non-state. The occupation would continue, just under 
another name and with increased impunity for the state of Israel. Beinin and Stein claim 
that ―this so-called ‗state‘‖ would be ―little more than a handful of cantons, surrounded 
by Israel and enjoying only limited sovereignty‖ (Beinin & Stein 2006, 15).  
It is obvious, from the Israel standpoint, that the façade of the Palestinian ―state‖ 
should receive only ―the outward semblance of sovereignty‖ (Chomsky 2003, 169). In 
2003 Chomsky predicted that should there emerge a Palestinian state from the system of 
Israeli expansion, ―there is every likelihood that it will be under the domination of 
Israel,‖ and this is the model that seems to be emerging (Chomsky 2003, 29). Israeli 
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officials have never intended to give up control of the oPt, and Defense Minister Dayan 
asserted that ―Israel should regard itself as the ‗permanent government‘ (memshelet keva) 
in the occupied territories‖ – Palestinian state or no (Chomsky 2003, 97). Similarly, in 
1977 Likud ―asserted that in Greater Israel (all of Palestine) there could only be Israeli 
sovereignty‖ (Reuveny 2003, 354).  
It is clear that though the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan ―state‖ serves Israeli 
interests, it will never result in self-determination for the Palestinian people. Therefore, 
resistance must take a path other than the declaration of Palestinian statehood. 
_______________ 
Resistance: Shifting Tactics 
Repeatedly while I was in Israel and the West Bank I was told that Palestinians 
have three options for responding to the occupation. A Palestinian woman from Tent of 
Nations in Bethlehem first laid them out for me: the first option is immigration – she said 
that people who leave do so in order to live as human beings and to not always want for 
things; the second option is to become resigned – people who choose this option remain 
in Israel-Palestine but live each day submissive to their life under occupation; and the 
final option is to react, either violently or nonviolently (From personal notes: Tent of 
Nations, Bethlehem, Palestine June 27, 2011). Similarly, a representative from TIPH 
(Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron)
15
 laid out the same three 
options: fight, flee, or live as alien residents (From personal Notes: TIPH representative, 
TIPH headquarters, Hebron, Palestine, June 28, 2011). Palestinians have repeatedly 
chosen the option of fighting this anti-colonial struggle.  
                                                          
15
 Website: http://www.tiph.org/. 
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Some resistance tactics employed by Palestinians follow the historical trend in 
anti-colonial struggle: the colonized pushing back against the colonizer to create an 
independent space for self-determination. For example, Palestinians have frequently 
employed economic boycotts of Israeli goods in an attempt to force the colonizer to relent 
and cease expansion (these methods were employed during both Intifadas) (Gelvin 2005, 
2007). While boycotts and sanctions from within Palestine have become less effective as 
Israel has reduced its dependence on trade with Palestinians, these approaches have not 
been completely laid to rest as resistance tactics; these means are still employed through 
the campaign for boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS Movement)
16
 where they have 
shifted so that international players are doing the boycotting. This movement seems to be 
having relatively little success, however, since Israeli expansion has not stopped; in part 
this is due to economically powerful Israeli backers, such as the United States. 
Palestinians have also resisted Israeli expansion by being physically present on 
the land, fighting back using the same tactics as the colonizer: the use of territoriality as a 
strategy for exercising sovereignty. Palestinians in Budrus (and in order villages) used 
this strategy when they physically got in the way of the construction of the ―security 
barrier,‖ resulting in its path being diverted around the town: 
Several Palestinian villages – Ni‘lin, Bi‘lin, Jayyous and others – are at the forefront of 
this popular struggle to oppose the continued construction of the Wall on their land. Non-
violent anti-wall demonstrations are organized by local committees, often by village 
youth. In Ni‘lin, these demonstrators consist mainly of local men and boys, international 
activists and some left-wing and anti-Zionist Israelis. Demonstrations vary in size from a 
few dozen to a few hundred people, depending on the significance of the occasion and the 
level of emotion. Flags, banners, t-shirts expressing solidarity, chants, loudspeakers, 
video cameras and the spirit of defiance and resistance – these are what they bring to the 
frontline (Parry 2011, 188). 
 
                                                          
16
 For more about the BDS movement and how you can become involved, see: 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/. 
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While I was in the West Bank I visited a place called the Tent of Nations where the land 
owners use similar tactics; though Israeli settlers from a settlement nearby frequently 
come and uproot hundreds of olive trees from the property, the owners respond by 
replanting (with interest). The idea is that as long as they plant Israel can‘t claim that the 
land is unused and fallow, in which case it would be declared state land and designated 
for use by the nearby settlement. Though the Palestinians at Tent of Nations are 
incredibly resilient and the villagers in Budrus were successful in impacting the path of 
the fence by standing in front of the bulldozers day after day and refusing to move from 
the land, these victories, while impressive, are limited. The barrier still carves deep into 
the West Bank in many locations and settlement expansion is ongoing.  
Palestinians also use tactics that draw attention to the injustice of the occupation 
in the hopes that international pressure will force Israel to withdraw. Frequently 
Palestinians throughout the oPt and within the borders of Israel hold rallies and protests 
which attract both Israeli and international support. Art on the separation wall is another 
means of drawing attention to its path and injustice. In reading William Parry‘s book 
about art on the wall, one of the images/slogans that stuck out to me again and again said: 
―To exist is to resist,‖ a message I often saw spray-painted on the barrier while I was in 
Israel-Palestine. The aim of art on the wall and the use of powerful slogans is to draw 
attention to the illegal path of the ―security‖ barrier; according to Parry, ―[t]he spray can 
hasn‘t forced Israel to stop building its highly controversial Wall, but in the skilled hands 
of a guerrilla street artist like Banksy, it‘s a formidable weapon in the struggle for hearts, 
minds and justice‖ as it has gained the attention of a Western audience and ―contributed 
to an awareness about the reality on the ground and the asymmetrical power struggle 
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between Palestinians and Israelis‖ (Parry 2011, 9). Again, though, the occupation 
continues. 
Not insignificantly, Palestinians have also resisted the occupation and Israeli 
expansionism by approaching the United Nations. The impetus behind the unilateral 
declaration of statehood by Palestine in the UN is the belief that statehood entails certain 
benefits: 
Maybe it could help the ‗peace talks‘ if they are redefined as negotiations between two 
states instead of preconditions for a state. Declaring statehood could redefine Israel‘s 
occupation as invasion and legitimize resistance as well as trigger different and more 
effective United Nations intervention. Maybe it will give Palestinians greater political 
leverage on the world stage… (Tilley 2011).  
 
Joseph Massad says that the perceived primary benefit of recognition as a state 
(international legal sovereignty) is the ability to use legal instruments only available to 
UN member states to force Israel to grant Palestinian independence (Massad 2011). 
According to Massad this is false logic since historically there has never been a lack of 
legal instruments to challenge Israel; Israel and the United States simply disregard these 
instruments repeatedly, an occurrence that will not change with recognition (Massad 
2011). Massad goes on to say, as I have been saying, that recognition as a state will never 
mean sovereignty for Palestinians because even if Palestinians achieve recognition Israel 
will simply say, ‗Okay, but that small fraction of discontinuous West Bank territory is 
your territory,‘ and Palestinians will remain ―colonized, discriminated against, oppressed, 
and exiled‖ (Massad 2011). An Israeli student at Tel Aviv University said: ―I think every 
human deserves the right to be a citizen, with a flag and anthem and a community…‖ 
(From personal notes: Tel Aviv University, Israel, July 21, 2011). The student from 
Hebrew University who told me about Israeli fears concerning terrorism said, similarly, 
that she personally believes that Palestinians should have their own country because it 
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gives you a sense of self to have your own flag, your own anthem (From personal notes: 
Bikhal, Hebrew University, Israel, June 29, 2011). But what are these things – flags and 
anthems – if you don‘t have self-determination, if your ―state‖ is not sovereign, if you 
cannot defend your rights?  
Ilan Pappe believes that the two-state solution has long been ill-advised despite 
having the backing of most of the world because ―everybody inside and outside Palestine 
seems to concede that the occupation will continue and that even in the best of all 
scenarios [recognition of Palestinian statehood], there will be a greater and racist Israel 
next to a fragmented and useless bantustan‖ (Pappe 2011). A non-sovereign state cannot 
effectively defend its citizens or their rights. In these apartheid-style Bantustans ―a fig 
leaf of autonomy would hide the reality of occupation,‖ which would continue 
indefinitely (Cook & Hanieh 2006, 342). A Palestinian Bantustan state would really only 
mean the continuation of the occupation under another name – the continuation of 
colonization. According to Rafael Reuveny, ―[c]olonial conflicts ended only when the 
colonial rulers gave up the colonies;‖ therefore, ―the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may only 
end following complete Israeli decolonization and the formation of a Palestinian state in 
its place‖ (Reuveny 2003, 347, 349). What is taking place, however, is the formation of a 
Palestinian ―state‖ without decolonization. Israel has clearly signaled its ―intention to 
hold onto the land forever,‖ so perhaps complete annexation and incorporation of the 
Palestinian populace into a single state with Israel is the only real solution for ending the 
conflict (Reuveny 2003, 368). Under this framework, annexation, as opposed to 
independence, would be the means of decolonization.  
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Reuveny strongly believes that ―if the Palestinian state takes the form of 
numerous discontinuous enclaves surrounded by Israeli land, the conflict likely will 
continue‖ (Reuveny 2003, 347). Just as desperation under occupation has led to violence 
and terrorism in the past, desperation over the complete lack of self-determination will 
continue to fuel the hundred year conflict. Virginia Tilley explains that Israel, like the 
South African apartheid regime, recognizes that Palestinians ―would forever resist the 
permanent denial of equal rights and political voice‖ that would be necessary to maintain 
the Jewish State; therefore, a Palestinian declaration of statehood would ―permanently 
absolve‖ the Israeli government of ―any responsibility for [Palestinian] political rights,‖ 
(Tilley 2011). Despite the fact that general consensus has held that partition ―is the only 
real solution to the future of that area,‖ and most ―agree on establishing two states in the 
area of the former British Palestine, a Jewish one and an Arab one,‖ perhaps these rights 
could be better fought for as citizens of one Jewish-Palestinian state (Biger 2008, 75, 91). 
Noam Chomsky argues that ―socialist binationalism offers the best long-range 
hope for a just peace in the region‖ (Chomsky 2003, 26). This may be true if a two-state 
solution includes Palestinian Bantustans. Chomsky suggests a federal state made up of 
autonomous districts with national autonomy for both peoples instead of a two-state 
outcome (Chomsky 2003, 33). This solution is not as radical as it might seem; as far back 
as 1940-1941 Adil Jabr, a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, floated the idea 
for ―a binational Palestine based on full equality within a broader federation of 
autonomous states‖ (Chomsky 2003, 34). A one-state solution may be the best outcome 
for both Israelis and Palestinians, who Chomsky asserts are both ―following a losing 
strategy,‖ – an outcome which is typical of national conflicts that ―rarely serve the 
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interests of those who are slaughtering or threatening one another‖ (Chomsky 2003, 73). 
Integration of the oPt into Israel may be ―the humane course‖ for ending the hundred year 
conflict in Israel-Palestine (Chomsky 2003, 98). Palestinians recognize the ―Israeli 
disposition to insist on an asymmetrical outcome that would not provide the Palestinian 
people with a viable and independent sovereign state‖ and they are choosing to fight this 
anti-colonial struggle in an innovative way (Falk 2003, 99).  
The Palestinian national cause is to put an end to the occupation and protect the 
rights of Palestinian refugees, and it appears that the solution to ending the occupation 
may not be the creation of a Palestinian state made up of a collection of fragmented and 
isolated Bantustans (Barghouti 2011, 21). Territorial division based on the internationally 
recognized border (the Green Line) will never happen due to settlement expansion and 
construction of the barrier; therefore, the solution to ending the occupation may not be 
national self-determination based on Palestinian statehood. Palestinian society is 
―fragmented and entrapped within a draconian regime of Bantustanization‖ and since 
―[n]o meaningful independence can be accomplished‖ under this framework, the way out 
of the occupation might be to go in (Hammami & Tamari 2006, 263, 271). 
Edward Said stressed that the ―uniqueness of the Palestinian case‖ can‘t be 
reduced to anticolonial resistance formulas such as those discussed in my literature 
review that entail pushing away from the colonizer; hence, a new form of resistance is 
necessary (Hochberg 2006). Gary Sussman suggests that a one-state solution may be the 
way to end the occupation, stating that ―a struggle against ‗occupation‘‖ is transforming 
into ―a struggle for one man, one vote,‖ and Said argued for ―creating an inclusive 
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Israeli-Palestinian society‖ as a way to end the conflict (Sussman 2006, 310; Hochberg 
2006, 52).  
Recently Palestinians have begun responding to the process of Bantustanization in 
a way that differs dramatically from other examples of anticolonial resistance. Instead of 
pushing back against the colonizer and demanding self-determination as a separate and 
sovereign entity, Palestinians have recognized that any future state based on the current 
―facts on the ground‖ would never be viable and sovereign; instead, they have decided to 
fight for their rights as Israeli citizens – if Israel refuses to withdraw from the oPt, the 
alternative is one state with one vote for each citizen (From personal notes: informal 
lecture, al-Quds University, Palestine, June 27, 2011).
 Palestinians ―are seeking any path 
– even annexation to Israel‖ in order to end the occupation and promote their rights 
(Sussman 2006, 313). A group Palestinian young people I met at Dheish Refugee Camp 
in Palestine said that most people in the camp, including themselves, favor a one-state 
solution, because they know that realistically there won‘t be a two-state solution due to 
the settlements and the security barrier (From personal notes: Ibdaa Cultural Center, 
Dheish Refugee Camp, Palestine, June 28, 2011). Annexation, rather than statehood, 
could be the way to end the occupation that cantonization would prolong (Sussman 2006, 
307). Palestinians are beginning to accept that ―the territorial basis for establishing a 
Palestinian state capable of exercising significant sovereign powers may no longer exist‖ 
– but they are not abandoning their struggle for self-determination (Beinin 2006, 37).  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
While I was in Israel, I was told by a Jewish-Israeli university student that the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not a dispute about territory, but a dispute over having a 
country. I pointed out that if the conflict was about having a country, then it had to be 
about territory since a country exists on territory, to which the speaker replied: ―Well yes, 
a country is not built on air, it is built on land, but the conflict is not about where the line 
will be drawn‖ (From personal notes: Kadima Youth representative, Tel Aviv University, 
Israel, July 21, 2011). I must say that I disagree; I think this is exactly what the conflict is 
about. 
As I have stated throughout, the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ―a 
contest over land and its control,‖ taking place within a global framework of a world 
made up of clearly bounded nation-states (Roy 2006, 282). The premise I began with in 
the literature review is that, under the seemingly implicit assumption that the globe is 
divided into mutually exclusive states (a fact which places Palestine‘s very existence on 
uncertain ground), territoriality is a strategy for exercising Westphalian sovereignty. This 
premise explains the logic behind Israeli expansion and construction of the security 
barrier in the West Bank, the two main methods of Israeli colonialism. Israel‘s 
understanding is that creating ―facts on the ground‖ (gaining territorial control) equates to 
sovereignty; therefore, Israeli expansion and construction of the security barrier represent 
the use of territoriality as a strategy for exercising sovereignty. 
_______________ 
 
 
64 
 
64 
 
Summary of Findings 
As explained in the data and discussion of findings chapter, this expansion serves 
several goals for the State of Israel, primary amongst these being maximum Israeli 
annexation of the West Bank and containment of the Palestinian people in a series of 
non-sovereign, isolated Bantustans referred to collectively as a ―state.‖ Further, because 
states are conceptually sovereign and responsible for the well-being of their own citizens, 
Israeli will no longer be held responsible for the rights of the Palestinian people. 
Palestinians are responding to the cantonization of the West Bank through a 
resistance strategy that is unusual because the colonized are not fighting to be separate 
and independent from their oppressors, but are instead pushing for annexation as the best 
option for achieving Palestinian rights. This tactic is being adopted as an alternative form 
of achieving self-determination in light of the understanding that a Palestinian ―state‖ in 
the form of a handful of noncontiguous Bantustans would never be sovereign and would 
be unable to defend the rights of its citizens. 
_______________ 
A Paradox Revealed 
In writing a thesis based on the premise that territoriality is a strategy for 
exercising sovereignty I may have inadvertently encountered a paradox. As described 
above, Israeli policy has shifted from complete annexation of the West Bank to maximum 
annexation and the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan ―state.‖ The difference between 
the two is that complete annexation means the land from the Jordan River to the sea 
would be claimed for the State of Israel, and the Palestinian people would have to move 
elsewhere; maximum annexation, on the other hand, has become the goal because Israel 
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recognizes that Palestinians aren‘t leaving their land (yet), and that annexing them would 
destroy the Jewish nature of the state. Therefore, maximum annexation is aimed at 
leaving as little land as possible for the Palestinian people to live on so they won‘t be 
included in the State of Israel. The resulting Palestinian entity, a Bantustan ―state,‖ would 
have international legal sovereignty but not the more tangible Westphalian sovereignty.  
The paradox lies in the fact that under this emerging reality Israel will continue to 
exercise sovereign power throughout the whole of the West Bank, whether designated as 
part of the Palestinian ―state‖ or as part of the State of Israel. But if territory is the key to 
sovereignty – its irreducible element – shouldn‘t Palestinians be sovereign even in their 
discontinuous and geographically limited ―state‖? Why won‘t the strategy of territoriality 
work for them as it is being employed by Israel? It seems that Palestinians cannot use 
territoriality as effectively as Israel can and does (a conclusion that Israeli policy makers 
seemed to have reached as well, since they don‘t fear the existence of a Palestinian 
―state‖ which they know would not have sovereign power). Territory, clearly, does not 
equate to sovereignty. 
Discovering this paradox may be one of the most important contributions of this 
study and should be explored in future projects. Possibly the relationship between 
territory and sovereignty is evolving, or the global system is evolving in such a way that 
this relationship and the nation-state system no longer make sense. It is also possible that 
a new form of politics is emerging, where the dichotomy between control and resistance 
no longer relies on territory.  
Perhaps this paradox should have been expected, since Stephen Krasner‘s primary 
thesis in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999) is that the rules of sovereignty are 
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frequently broken – which is the reason behind him terming it ―hypocrisy‖ (Krasner 
1999). Certain questions arise in response to this observation: Who organizes the 
hypocrisy? Who do the rules work for? And who can suspend normal operations? Partha 
Chatterjee, in discussing nationalism, points out that when nationalism does not achieve 
its ideal (liberty), it is explained away by saying that conditions existed that were 
―unpropitious to freedom,‖ and which inhibited nationalism from functioning properly; 
nationalism is never seen by liberal-rationalists to be theoretically flawed (Chatterjee 
1993). Therefore, perhaps the fact that territoriality won‘t achieve sovereignty for 
Palestinians has nothing to do with rules being broken in certain circumstances, but rather 
has to do with theoretical flaws in the link between territory and sovereignty. Again, this 
is a question for further research, but it is clear that Israel is effectively detaching 
sovereignty and territory to its advantage, in line with Foucault and Krasner‘s assertions 
that the ―powers that be‖ can suspend these mechanisms for their benefit. And since new 
forms of control give rise to new, responsive forms of resistance, counterforce must learn 
to detach territory and sovereignty as well.  
In turning from demands for statehood to a push for annexation, Palestinians are 
using the master‘s tools to dismantle the master‘s house – they are choosing not to seek 
independence because formal sovereignty (international legal sovereignty) does not 
always equal actual sovereignty (Westphalian sovereignty). Everything about how 
sovereignty works is related to others, and Israel, with its superior might and international 
support, will never allow a Palestinian entity to be truly independent. Anti-colonial 
resistance is aimed at achieving self-determination (which is more complicated than 
getting your own territory – or state, or nation) and annexation is an alternative way of 
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achieving this. Perhaps this tactic is being employed because the formal designation of 
―statehood‖ just doesn‘t matter anymore. Instead, annexation may prove to be the next 
step in the decolonization struggle, especially if Palestinians are receiving ―statehood‖ 
without decolonization – but will they be better off? 
_______________ 
What Will the Future Hold? 
Whether Israeli citizenship will actually secure Palestinians their rights is a toss-
up. The reality on the ground must be compared to rhetoric – citizenship sounds good, 
but Palestinians currently living within the borders of Israel certainly don‘t enjoy equal 
rights as citizens of the Jewish State. As stated previously, Israel recognizes that 
Palestinians ―would forever resist the permanent denial of equal rights and political 
voice‖ that would be necessary to maintain the Jewish State, but this doesn‘t mean that, if 
forced to annex the Palestinian population, Israel won‘t deny them these rights anyway 
(Tilley 2011). Therefore, it is possible that even if they successfully achieve annexation, 
Palestinians will simply remain second-class citizens in the State of Israel for another 
fifty years or more, until the international community unites to force Israel to provide 
equal rights and citizenship, like South Africa was eventually forced to end its own 
apartheid regime. But if bad options are the only ones available to Palestinians, 
annexation might be the least bad option (especially when compared to cantonization).  
It is also possible that the day will come when Israel will no longer get away with 
its actions and abuses in the West Bank (and the rest of the oPt). Israel can‘t function in a 
vacuum, and though it enjoys a privileged position in the current global system, 
privileged positions don‘t last forever (again, South Africa enjoyed a privileged position 
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that allowed it to get away with apartheid, but only for a time). Even though Westphalian 
sovereignty is meant to extend over the globe, it differentiates in the way it operates. 
Israel is currently ―in‖ with the powers who decide when to suspend the rules, but these 
might not be the great powers in the future. If history shows anything, it is that power 
relations and imbalances shift over time. All that is clear is that events, as they are 
currently emerging, will result in a non-sovereign Palestinian Bantustan ―state,‖ not 
Palestinian independence. 
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